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how they are assimilating, and how they organize and act socially, culturally, and 
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L INTRODUCTION 
The passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 marked the end of 
ethnic preferences in immigration; an immigrant's admission was no longer based on 
country of origin. The change in policy made it possible for record numbers of Arab 
immigrants to enter the United States. This current migration is distinct in its high 
numbers, varied nationalities, and religious adherence to Islam. 
Another distinguishing attribute of this immigration wave is the lack of information 
on their demographic and cultural composition. For example, the landmark Harvard 
Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups (1980) mentions the arrival of the new 
immigrants but fails to provide a substantive profile. 
Recent events such as the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings have 
generated considerable interest in the Arab-American and Muslim-American communities. 
Contrary to public belief, the terms Arab and Muslim are not interchangeable and the 
communities are not synonymous. The majority of Arab-Americans are not Muslims. In 
fact, of the estimated 5-7 million Muslims in the United States, the Arabs are the third 
largest ethnic group following the African-Americans and Indo-Pakistanis. I 
The resultant portraits of Arab-Americans, even those completed by responsible 
journalists and academics, are shallow and anecdotal. The incomplete coverage has bred 
1 There are an estimated one billion Muslims world wide and only 200 million are Arabs. The 
remaining 800 million include persons from such diverse countries as Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, India, 
Pakistan, and the Philippines. Large Muslim populations can also be found in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Europe. 
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and encouraged ignorance and, in some instances, hatred and violence. 2 Americans, 
already imprinted with images of terrorism generated by past conflicts with Libya, Iran, 
and Iraq, accept the superficial depictions as gospel. 
Steve Emerson's documentary on Arab terrorist networks in the United States, 
Jihad in America (1994), is the best example of the inflammatory exposes. Although 
Emerson states the majority of Arab-Americans do not condone or participate in the 
terrorist networks, the film leaves the distinct impression all Arab immigrants are members 
of an Islamic conspiracy determined to undermine world peace and destroy the United 
States. Compounding the negative imagery, members of academia and government have 
tried to fill the enemy void left by the demise of Communism with Islam. 3 Americans 
"have replaced the red threat with the green threat, namely Islam." (Sheehan in Brooke 
1995) 
In addition to the waves of fear generated by visions of an Islamic fifth column, 
Americans have a growing apprehension of all immigrants. Unrestricted migration is 
changing the country under our feet. The U.S. Census Bureau projects non-European 
ethnic minorities will comprise over 50 percent of the country's population by the year 
2050. 
2 In 1986 during the Reagan Administration's showdown with Libya 49 anti-Arab crimes were 
reported. The number jumped to 119 during the Gulf War and 222 in the three days following the 
Oklahoma City bombing. The incidents included bombings, shootings, and vandalism. (ADC 1987; 
ADC 1991; CAIR 1995) 
3 The Spring 1995 issue of Foreign Policy features a Graham Fuller article entitled "The Next 
Ideology." The article includes a picture of Muslim women in traditional black hijabs with automatic 
weapons. The caption reads "Challenging Western Ideology." 
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The average American does not desire the economic and cultural changes that will 
accompany this demographic shift. Demands for immigration reform and increased border 
security are but two of the manifestations of American dissatisfaction with the status quo 
and the projected future. A 1993 Gallup Poll quantifies the perceived threat of the "new" 
immigrants: 
• 65 percent of the respondents felt immigration should be decreased. 4 
• 55 percent of the respondents felt immigrants threatened American 
culture. 
• 56 percent of the respondents felt immigrants drained public resources 
for education, welfare, and health care. 
• 64 percent of the respondents felt immigrants hurt the American 
economy by stealing jobs and lowering wages. (Moore 1993) 
The same poll asked participants their feelings on specific immigrant groups. For 
the first time, Arabs were included in the question. Arab immigrants received the lowest 
approval rating when 64 percent of participants responded that too many immigrants were 
being allowed into the country from the Arab world.s (Moore 1993) 
This thesis is a contemporary look at the Arab-Americans within the framework of 
the immigration debate: have Arab immigrants contributed to American prosperity or are 
the poll results justified and Arab-Americans are a threat? A demographic and cultural 
4The 1993 poll marked the first time a majority said immigration should be decreased. Previous 
polls in 1986, 1977, and 1965 indicated 49, 42, and 33 percent respectively, felt the immigration rate 
needed to be cut 
5 In a similar question, people were asked to rate immigrants from selected nations on their 
contribution to society. No Arab nationalities were included, but the Iranians were. Sixty-eight percent of 
those polled responded Iranian immigrants had "created problems for the country." (Moore 1993) The 
disapproval rating was the highest of any nationality. 
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profile of the Arab-Americans community which will examine in detail who they are, 
where they are, and how they are, will provide the answer. 
Who the Arab-Americans are is not a clear cut issue. To begin with, there is some 
debate over what it means to be Arab. Dr. Phillip Hitti, a recognized scholar and expert in 
Arab history, defines Arab as follows: "Arabs in modem usage is a term applied to Arabic 
speaking peoples who at present occupy the area extending from Iraq to Morocco. The 
term, therefore, is a linguistic rather than an ethnic one." (Arab American Almanac 
1994) 
Charles Issawi, writing on the topic during the height of the pan-Arab movement, 
offered a broader definition: Arabs are those persons "inhabiting a definite stretch of 
territory, bound by ties of kinship, speaking a common language, sharing common 
historical memories, and practicing a common way, expressed in the form of religion and 
other cultural traits." (Drysdale and Blake 1985) A closer examination of the region's 
history reveals anything but cultural and historical uniformity. None the less, an intangible 
and nebulous Arabic heritage exists. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the Census Bureau definition of Arab-Americans 
will be used. Arab-Americans include" those persons who trace their ancestry to the 
northern African countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia, and 
the western Asian countries of Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen." (CP-3-2 1990) 
The fluid nature of the term Arab and the hyphenate Arab-American, impacts the 
immigrants' identity at the community and individual levels. Different Arab-American 
groups have adopted different meanings of the word Arab (Haddad 1994). The evolution 
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of their ethnic identity is included in Chapter IT for immigrants arriving before 1967 and 
Chapter IV for immigrants arriving after 1967. 
Chapter IT also includes a summary of the early Arab migration to the United 
States and the cultural institutions they established and participated in. The first Arab 
arrivals were predominantly single Christian males from the Ottoman province of Syria or, 
what is today, Lebanon. They are distinguished by their homogeneity and their near 
complete assimilation by the end of World War IT. 
The second wave of Arab arrivals revitalized the community in the early fifties. 
Western educated, the majority of the immigrants were Muslim professionals escaping the 
growing turmoil in the Middle East. They retained the secular aspects of Arab culture 
while marginalizing their Islamic upbringing. 
Present day Arab immigrants are considered part of a third wave, commencing in 
1967 after the change in immigration laws and the Arab defeat in the Six Day War. As 
previously mentioned, these immigrants outnumber their predecessors: 75 percent of Arab 
immigrants arrived after 1964. They also come from different countries. Whereas the 
majority of the first wave were Christian, this group is Islamic. The details of the recent 
migration pattern is examined in Chapter ill. 
Chapter ill also contains a demographic profile of the entire Arab-American 
community and a comparison of the Arab-American aggregate to the national average in 
certain economic and cultural statistics. The data reveals Arab-Americans are a diverse 
community, as varied as the homelands they left behind. Lebanese Christians still 
comprise the largest percentage of the population, but their dominance is being challenged 
by Muslim new comers from the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa. 
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The Arab-Americans are concentrated in twenty metropolitan areas, with Detroit 
having the highest population. The largest numbers have settled in three states; over one 
third of Arab-Americans live in California, New York, and Michigan. 
The majority of Arab-Americans are American born and hold U.S. citizenship. On 
average, they are younger, wealthier, and higher educated than other Americans. Over 
two-thirds of the Arab-Americans participating in the labor force are white collar workers. 
In addition, their unemployment rates are lower than the national average. 
Statistics on Arabs arriving between 1980 and 1990 were compared to the Arab-
American aggregate to determine the economic and social impact of the most recent 
arrivals on the community. The newer immigrants had lower average incomes and higher 
incidence of poverty. However, their education levels are comparable to the American 
average and their occupational profile revealed a majority were white collar workers. 
The final section of Chapter Ill ranks selected ethnic groups in economic and 
educational categories. Of the thirteen groups, the Arab-Americans placed consistently in 
the top half of the standings and within one or two places of the national average. 
Chapter IV completes the portrait of the Arab-Americans by addressing their 
cultural identity and the institutions designed to maintain it. Again, the diversity and 
subsequent fragmentation of the community emerges. National and religious differences 
affect the social and civic incorporation of the community and the individual. 
The majority of Arab-Americans are Christians and one would think they would 
have no difficulties in joining the Judea-Christian mainstream. Instead they are 
marginalized for two reasons. First, a large percentage of Arab Christians belong to 
distinct Eastern Orthodox churches and second, the Protestant Arab-Americans practice a 
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more conservative strain of Christianity. As a result, Arab-American churches were 
established and continue to proliferate. (Haddad 94) 
Muslim emigration from the Islamic world to the West is as new to the history of 
the religion as it is to the history of the United States. Conflict between Islam and Judea-
Christian America is not limited to the Sabbath. Being able to abide by dietary 
restrictions, wear traditional clothing, and attend religious services are three of the 
smallest obstacles Arab Muslims encounter. Additionally, the mosques in the United 
States are not like the mosques in the Middle East. The majority of American Muslims are 
not Arabs, but African-Americans and Indo-Pakistani immigrants and, as a result, seven 
out of ten mosques are multicultural and do not adhere to Arab cultural norms. (Dart 
1995; Haddad 1994) 
Prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Arab culture in America was near extinction. 
The Arab-American community was overwhelmed by the war's " ... one-sided press 
coverage, the general U.S. public support of Israeli aggression, and the apparent deliberate 
effort by the United States government to prolong the United Nations debate for the · 
cease-:fire ... until Israel had achieved its objectives." (Haddad 1994} 
Anger about the war and the concurrent empowerment of minorities in American 
society combined to create an Arab renaissance. Mosque and church attendance rose, 
Arabic lessons became fashionable for second and third generations, academics began to 
chronicle the Arab-American experience, and the community attempted to enter the 
political arena. 
The renaissance was short lived but the effects of the cultural resurgence are still 
visible today. National organizations such as the Association of Arab-American 
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University Graduates (AAUG) formed after the war have are still active and working to 
influence U.S. foreign policy and correct the negative stereotype of Arab-Americans. 
These organizations were the first to transcend the religious and national differences in the 
community and to unite American born and immigrant Arabs in common goals. (Haddad 
1994; Sulieman 1994) 
Chapter IV also includes the Arab-American efforts to develop political influence. 
Initial Arab-American failures had four major causes. First, their negative image and 
repeated confrontations between the United States and the Middle East6 made any 
political affiliation with them a public relations disaster. Second, the Arab-Americans' 
natural enemy in Washington D.C. is the powerful Jewish-American lobby. Few 
politicians were willing to sacrifice the votes and financial support of the Jewish-American 
lobby to adopt a pro-Arab stance. Third were the Arab-Americans themselves, their 
diversity made it impossible to reach a consensus on any issues other than humanitarian. 
Lastly, the Arab-American political organizations were new and had yet to find the right 
leaders and the right messages to mobilize the community. (Bard 1991; Shain 1995) 
The Arab-Americans found their political voice during the national election of 
19887 and have had gained considerable respect in the years since. The turnaround is due 
to combination of factors. The Arab American Institute (AAI) founded in 1985, was the 
first national organization to take a grassroots approach to political mobilization. The 
6 Events such as the 1973 oil embargo, the Iranian Hostage Crisis, the bombing of the Marine 
barracks in Lebanon, and the Berlin Disco bombing made anything Arab despised by the American 
public. (Sulieman 1988) 
7 Fifty Arab-Americans represented the community as delegates and members of the Democratic 
National Convention. They came within a few votes of placing Palestinian self-determination on the 
Democratic plank. (Samhan 1989) 
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AAI focused on voter registration, local elections, and party membership. Progress in the 
Arab-Israeli peace talks has eased the competition between the Arab-American and Jewish 
lobbies and increased Arab-American access to the politicians. The Arab-Americans have 
also altered their political strategy. Their old anti-Israeli focus alienated potential 
supporters. The Arab-Americans have learned to frame their political messages in a 
national interest context to increase their appeal. (Shain 1995) 
Like most, the conclusion contains a summary of the thesis. It also includes a 
synopsis of the forces influencing Arab-American unity. Although the factors pushing for 
unity--multicultural America, political inaccessibility, anti-Arab racism, religion, and 
technology--are more numerous than the pressures against it--Arab-American 
heterogeneity and lack of a common identity--the latter are stronger. It is doubtful the 
Arab-Americans will ever be able reach agreement on their political and cultural identity. 
And until they do, the community will struggle to become a distinctive voice in American 
society and political life. 
9 
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IT. THE EARLY ARAB-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Arab immigration is divided into three separate waves. The first, from 1876 to 
World War II, was largely composed of Christian Arabs from what is today Syria and 
Lebanon. The second wave ofimmigrants arrived between 1945 and 1967. 
Predominantly well-educated professionals, they represented all regions of the Middle 
East. This chapter will summarize the first and second waves' historical experiences in . 
the United States. 
B. MIGRATION FACTORS 
Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II wanted to expand his Empire's trade. He looked 
westward, past Europe to the United States. The year was 1876 and Philadelphia was 
hosting the Centennial Exposition. The sultan ordered his best artisans to attend and 
exhibit their crafts. A large number of the men who made the journey were from the 
Ottoman millet of Syria and they returned home with stories of limitless wealth and 
opportunity. The artisans and their reports of American "streets made of gold" are 
credited with inspiring the first wave of Arabs to migrate to the United States. (Naff 
1994) 
They called themselves the al-Nizaleh, the visitors, because they did not intend to 
make America their home (Sulieman 1994). Lured by the success stories of Arabs who 
had been to America and returned, they were predominantly young, single males who had 
been sent by their families to work, make money, and return to their villages. (Naff 1994; 
Sulieman 1994) 
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The majority of the first wave immigrants came from Mount Lebanon, one of the 
most prosperous regions of the quickly decaying Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth 
century. The relative prosperity that should have kept the Arabs from leaving actually 
enabled them to do so. Not living hand to mouth allowed families to finance the trip. 
(Naff 1994) 
The exact number of first wave immigrants is impossible to discern. Until1899, 
the U.S. immigration records placed the Arabs in the same category as other arrivals from 
the Ottoman Empire: Turkish. From 1899 until the end ofWorld War IT, the immigrants 
were labeled as Syrians. The number of Syrians in the record books is not representative 
of Arab arrivals due to the random designation of some Arabs as Other Asian, Other 
African or Refugee. This problem would continue until the mid-sixties. (Karpat 1985; 
Naff 1983; Sulieman 1994) Figures 2-1 and 2-2 are best estimates ofthe number and 
gender of early arrivals.8 There is no documentation of the immigrants' religion. Based 
upon oral histories and geographical origins of the Arabs, it is believed 90 to 95 percent 
of the first wave pioneers were Christian. 9 (Naff 1994) 
Before and after World War I, Arab immigration peaked. A rising trend of 
isolationism threatened to limit future migration and time was limited for the women and 
children to escape the war torn area and the incoming mandate governments. The 
Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 placed an annual limit of 100 persons on Syrian immigration 
and halted the first wave. (Naff 1994; Sulieman 1994) 
8 For exact numbers refer to the tables in Appendix A. 
9 Some estimates place Muslim immigration considerably higher at 15 to 20 percent of the total 
influx. (Karpat 1985) 
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Unlike the pioneers, the second wave was much larger and more heterogeneous. 
Arriving between World War II and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, they represented every 
country in the Middle East and North Africa as illustrated in Figures 2-3 and 2-4. IO Male 
immigrants were more frequent than female, but the gap between the two genders had 
closed considerably. In another demographic shift, the Muslim immigrants outnumbered 
the Christians in roughly a three to two ratio. II (Abu-Laban and Sulieman 1989; Naff 
1983) 
The second wave was dominated by students and professionals. The students 
arrived in the United States with the intent to get their degrees and return home. They 
stayed instead. The education and opportunities available to them in the states far 
outweighed the temptation to return home to a region of increasing instability. The 
professionals, most of whom had been educated in the West and had returned home, 
sought to escape for the same reason. The nationalist and socialist movements sweeping 
the Middle East destroyed the achievement based " ... distribution of goods, services, and 
economic, as well as social, rewards." (Elkholy 1969) The repressive military regimes and 
the rising tension between Israel·and the Arab states created a volatile environment the 
intellectuals and professionals could live without. (S Abraham 1983; Elkholy 1969; Naff 
1983) 
10 Exact numbers are located in Appendix A 
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Figure 2-4. Origins of Arab Immigrants, 1948-67. After 
Orfalea 1988. North Africa includes Algeria, Djibouti, Libya, Sudan, & 
Tunisia. Arabian Peninsula includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, and Yemen. 
C. CULTURALIDENTITY 
The first immigrants identified themselves by religious sect, first as Muslim or 
Christian and then by denomination such as Sunni or Druze, Maronite or Melkite. When 
interacting outside Arab enclaves, they referred to themselves and were called Syrians or 
Syrian-Americans after the Ottoman millet they had come from. The end of World War I 
and the emergence of the state ofLebanon resulted in the introduction of national identity. 
The community split between the Lebanese and Syrian. (Sulieman 1994) Within one 
generation, however, the labels became irrelevant. The second generation had assimilated 
and abandoned their heritage. They thought of themselves as Americans. (S Abraham 
1983; Abu-Laban 1989) 
The second wave's entrance into American society coincided with the Arab 
nationalist movement in the Middle East. The new arrivals did not find the factional 
divisions or complete loss of identity acceptable so the Arab-American hyphenate was 
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introduced. The expression of pan-Arab sentiment in the United States mirrored its 
popularity in the Middle East. The failure of the United Arab Republic and the defeat of 
the Arab forces in 1967 meant the death ofpan-Arabism in both societies. Arab 
immigrants " ... returned to identifying solely with their home countries while verbally 
indicating their approval of notions of greater Arab unity." (S Abraham 1983) 
D. ASSIMILATION 
Arriving in America during the heyday of the melting pot philosophy, the pressure 
for the first wave to Americanize was high (Abu-Laban and Sulieman1989). Additionally, 
the immigrants primary motive for migrating was economic and success in their trade, 
peddling, 12 depended on assimilation 
Peddling sped the Americanization of the Arabs. Negligible English skills 
improved with interaction with their customers and increased sales due to enhanced 
communication provided the motivation to learn. Peddling was a lucrative business, 13 
allowing the Arabs to enter the middle class within years of arrival. The continuous travel 
exposed them to most positive aspects of the American dream: the farmhouses and the 
small businesses that could be theirs if only they worked hard enough. Life on the road 
also inhibited the establishment of formal institutions such as churches and mosques to 
reinforce cultural norms and the geographic diffusion made the Arabs less of a threat to 
White America. The occasional dark-skinned merchant with adequate financial means and 
12 Ninety percent of single males arriving before 1914left New York to become peddlers. (Naff 
1983) 
13 Arab peddlers earned an average of$1,000 a year, 30 percent higher than the national average 
at the turn of the centmy. (Naff 1983) 
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English skills and no national identity did not attract the hatred and suspicion the ghettoes 
of other impoverished minorities did. (Naff 1983; 1994) 
Learning English and wearing Western clothes to increase business did not 
necessarily conflict with Arab culture. The pioneer immigrants equated family honor with 
wealth and were therefore willing to adjust to increase their wealth. In sum, " ... the 
attempts of the immigrant generation to maintain Arab culture ran afoul of their eagerness 
to succeed in the United States; the requirements of success relegated tradition to second 
place." (Naff 1983) 
World War I was a watershed event for the first wave of immigrants. Any doubts 
about staying in the United States were resolved with the Ottoman entrance into the war. 
The al-Nizaleh could not return home. The resultant separation, reinforced by a vocal 
appeal in the Arab-American press " ... that the Nizaleh should make a positive 
contribution to the United States in order to show gratitude for reaping the benefits of 
being in this country ... ," (Sulieman 1994) created a massive movement within the Ntzaleh 
to Americanize. The overt call for assimilation reinforced the already growing trend in 
that direction. 
Westernized before their arrival, the second wave Muslim professionals 
marginalized their cultural practices. They did not attend mosques, the women discarded 
their veils, and an estimated two-thirds married outside their religion (Abu-Laban 1989; 
Caink:ar 1994). Most had a good command of the English language and a high enough 
education to get well paying jobs that granted immediate access to the American middle 
class. 
18 
Politics not culture was the stumbling block for the complete assimilation of the 
second wave. The new arrivals disagreed with U.S. policy on Israel and the nationalist 
movements. However, those immigrants who had become politicized soon tempered their 
convictions. Pressure generated by the Cold War made American society hostile to any 
dissension. (Naff 1983) 
By the mid-sixties the environment had changed considerably; cultural differences 
and political dissent were socially acceptable. The late arrivals of the second wave did 
not feel compelled to surrender their cultural or political beliefs, but neither did they find · 
immediate outlets for them. 
E. EARLY ARAB-AMERICAN MUSLIMS 
Like the majority of first wave arrivals, the first Muslim immigrants were young, 
single men drawn to America by the economic opportunities. They did not view their 
journey to the states as a threat to their faith, their stay was going to be only temporary. 
In fact, the majority of the immigrants who did return home were Muslims. Despite 
numbering in the thousands by the turn of the century, no mosques were established until 
the 1920's. The nature oflslaml4 and the immigrants' intentions to return home after 
making their fortunes did not need formal institutions. (Abu-Laban 1989) 
The first known effort to organize communal prayers occurred in Ross, North 
Dakota in 1900. Without an imam or mosque, the prayer meetings were held in private 
homes and led by the older men. Ross had one of three functioning mosques in th~ United 
States during the 1920's. The thirty years without a formal organization and educated 
14 Islam is a" "portable" faith ... not hampered by the necessity for clergy, sacraments, or 
specified structures." (Haddad 1994) 
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leadership took its toll: the second generation did not learn Arabic and a shortage of 
Muslim females led to intermarriage. By 1948, the Muslims had adopted Christian names 
and the mosque was abandoned. (Abu-Laban 1989; Haddad 1983; Naff 1994) 
The early mosques that did succeed bared less resemblance to the masjids in the 
Middle East than the American churches down the street. The American mosques quickly 
became the social and cultural centers of the Muslim settlements. Like their Christian 
counterparts, the mosques hosted weddings, funerals, special dinners, and even white 
elephant and bake sales. Women and children would participate in events not available in· 
their homelands by teaching and attending Sunday schools. Youth groups were organized 
to promote intra-faith courtships and marriages. (Abu-Laban 1989; Haddad 1983) The 
mosque leadership also became Americanized. Local congregations did their own hiring 
and firing of the imams, a practice unheard of in the Middle East where the mosques are 
controlled by ministries (Haddad 1983). 
The larger role of the mosques required the imams to expand their duties. Prior to 
their Americanization, the imams' primary function was to lead the prayers and Friday 
sermons. The responsibilities grew to include "the administration and maintenance of the 
mosque, ... attending to the community's general welfare ... representing them in 
intereligious functions ... (and) lecturing about Islam in churches and schools." (Haddad 
1994) 
The Americanization of Islam is a phenomenon restricted to the first wave of Arab 
Muslim immigrants. They lacked. the population, economic, and social status as well as 
the formal institutions to prevent the acculturation of the religion. 
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The arrival of the second wave of immigrants had no impact on Muslim 
assimilation. Religion played a diminished role in their lives with greater emphasis placed 
on nationalist and secular issues. The majority are Eid Muslims, attending the mosque 
only on major holidays. Another indicator of their lack of interest in Islam is the 
prevalence of interfaith marriages, 66 percent are estimated to have married outside of the 
religion. (Elkholy 1969) 
F. EARLY ARAB-AMERICAN CHRISTIANS 
Although the majority of first wavers were Christians, they were not welcomed 
with open arms into America's churches. The Arab-American Christians followed the 
liturgy of apostolic churches such as the Antiochan Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Maronite, 
and Melkite sects. IS 
The Eastern churches survived the transplantation to the United States, but they 
did not remain unchanged. Many immigrants left the churches, noted for their ornate rites 
and continued use of ancient languages in their liturgies, in· search of more modern 
services. Before losing all of their parishioners, the churches made some 
accommodations. The Chaldean and Coptic services gradually ended their practice of 
gender segregation, English liturgies are available in a number of Orthodox churches, and 
music is no longer forbidden. (Haddad 1994; Naff 1983) 
G. SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS AND THE ARAB-AMERICAN PRESS 
Faced with accelerating assimilation, culture conscious first wave immigrants 
formed a network of social clubs. The organizations' purpose was to provide a forum for 
15 Appendix B contains descriptions of the Eastern Christian churches. 
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Arab singles to stem the increasing rate of intermarriage created by a shortage of single 
Arab women in the United States and the difficulty and expense of returning home to 
marry. Because marrying outside one's religious sect was regarded with the same disdain 
of marrying a non-Arab, the membership in the early groups was based upon religious 
affiliation. 
Besides fulfilling the role of a dating service, the organizations were centers of 
charity fundraising. The groups would compete for the prestige of funding the largest 
hospital, school, or church in their homelands. They also sponsored similar institutions irr 
the United States and awarded scholarships to deserving second generation Arab-
Americans. 
The closest the early organizations came to political participation was the identity 
debate sparked by the creation ofLebanon. A distinct Maronite group supporting an 
independent Lebanon with a Maronite dominated government was founded. With that 
exception, the Arab-Americans would remain apolitical until 1948. (Naff 1994) 
After World War II, the dramatic change in the education levels of arriving 
immigrants and the turbulent political landscape of the Middle East led to the founding of 
political organizations. The early political groups did not have the impact on U.S. foreign 
policy they desired, but they did set important precedents for future organizations. For 
the first time, the organizations overcame sectarian allegiance and membership was based 
upon common nationality or ethnicity. Also, the groups "initiated the consciousness 
raising process" (Naff 1983) among the descendants of the first wave immigrants. 
The first Arab language newspaper in the United States was printed in April 1892. 
Founded in New York City and using a printing press imported from Egypt, the Kawkab 
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America started an Arab-American enchantment with the printed word. The earliest 
papers mirrored the earliest organizations. They were established by the different religious 
sects and provided information on social events and news from the homeland. Unlike their 
organization counterparts, the papers promoted assimilation by including articles on 
adapting to life in the United States.l6 
Between the World Wars, the press played a vital role in the assimilation debate. 
The first English language paper for Arab-Americans, The Syrian World, appeared in 
1926. A non-factional paper, the publication targeted second generation Arab-Americans 
and its editorial page became the battlefield of the Americanized and Nativist Arab-
Americans. The debate started with the printing of a letter from Dr. Michael Shadid in 
1927. Entitled "Syria for the Syrians," the letter stated Arab-Americans should return to 
their homelands to escape prejudice and to help with the modernization of their countries. 
The debate the article stimulated lasted for a year with both sides outlining their arguments 
on the back page of The Syrian World. No resolution appeared possible until Dr. Shadid 
submitted a second letter, "Explanation and Retraction." The letter detailed a trip to 
Lebanon Dr. Shadid took with his daughter. Meant to be reconnaissance for future 
relocation, the trip was a disaster. His daughter hated the living conditions and Dr. Shadid 
admitted the country was years behind the United States economically and socially. As a 
result ofhis visit, Dr. Shadid decided to give up "all thoughts of returning to Lebanon." 
(Halaby 1988; Sulieman 1988) 
16 A number of newspaper publishers would also branch out into book production. The books 
were English primers, American history and cultural guides, and instructions for obtaining U.S. 
citizenship. Books and periodicals concerning Arab history and culture were non-existent until after 
World War II. (Arab-American Almanac, 1994; Naff 1983) 
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After a wartime lull in printing activity, the Arab-American presses reactivated in 
the early 1950's. The new journals differed from their predecessors in two ways: politics 
became the main subject and English became the norm not the exception. The period also 
saw the development of mixed language papers designed to unite American born and 
immigrant readers' opinions on the Arab-Israeli conflict and Arab Nationalism. At the 
same time, books and periodicals on Arab culture and history began to appear and gain in 
popularity. The genre even included works on the Arab-American experience. The press 
shifted from a promoter of assimilation to a preserver of Arab cultural and political 
identity. (Arab-American Almanac 1994) 
H. CONCLUSION 
Although many believe Arab immigration is a recent phenomenon, the first Arab-
Americans left the Ottoman Empire for America's streets of gold in the late 1800's. 
Those arrivals, referred to as the first wave, were predominantly single, Christian males 
from what is today Lebanon and Syria. They embraced the institutions and culture 
generated by the American version of constitutional democracy. They bettered their 
economic standings within their own lifetimes and ensured their children would have the 
education and modem conveniences they went without. They assimilated. 
The second wave of immigrants arrived between 1948 and 1967. Originating from 
all of the Arab nations, these immigrants were likely to be Western educated professionals 
seeking economic and social freedoms no longer available in the Middle East due to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and the nationalist and socialist revolutions sweeping the region. 
More culture conscious than their predecessors, their adaptation to life in the United 
States is better described as integration than assimilation. Their professional standing and 
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education ensured quick civic and social incorporation, yet they maintained the secular 
manifestations of their Arab heritage such as language skills and interest in homeland 
affairs. 
The following chapter begins with the migration of the third wave. Relaxed 
immigration quotas and the Six Day War in 1967 mark a great change in the type and 
number of Arab immigrants arriving in the United States: they are younger, poorer, and 
Muslim. They outnumber their predecessors and they are well on their way to establishing 
a strong Arab-American community ofMuslim faith in the United States. 
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ill. DEMOGRAPIDC PROFILE OF THE ARAB-AMERICANS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The third wave of immigrants initially mimicked the educational and cultural 
profile of the second wave arrivals: male, university educated, secularized Muslims from 
the professional classes. By 1970, family unification, not occupational skills, became the 
basis for awarding visas and the number of Arab immigrants increased while their 
qualifications decreased. Along with wives and children came the unskilled brothers and . 
sisters of prior immigrants. The poverty and destruction created by the 1973 War and 
subsequent Middle Eastern conflicts such as the Lebanese Civil War and the Iran-Iraq War 
also affected the immigration pool; Arabs, previously content in their homelands, sought 
escape from the devastation by seeking refugee status or entrance through family 
members. 
This chapter, constructed from data from the 1990 U.S. Census, 17 is intended to 
provide a factual account of the contemporary Arab-American community. Aside from 
detailing the migration pattern of-the third wave, it will answer the questions, how many 
Arab-Americans are there, where do they live, what occupations do they hold, how many 
speak English, and what is their financial status? 
17 The statistics from the 1990 census are not perfect. The Census Bureau admits to 
discrepancies in minority reporting. For example, the Arab-American population is listed over 800,000 
strong by the census. Literature on the community estimates the community's size between two and three 
million. (Arab-American Almanac 1994; Naff 1994; Abu-Laban 1994). Ambiguous questions are to 
blame for the discrepancy. The census data provides only a "snapshot" of the Arab-Americans. 1990 was 
the first year the ethnic group was included in the survey. 
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The Arab-American community is an amalgamation of the descendants of the 
pioneer immigrants, the second wave migrants and their offspring, and the recent arrivals. 
To demonstrate the differences between the community and the newer arrivals, the Arab-
American aggregate is contrasted to immigrants arriving between 1980 and 1990. 
Furthermore, to gain perspective on the Arab-Americans affluence, educational 
attainment, and language abilities, they are compared to other American ethnic groups. 
B. CURRENT MIGRATION PATTERN 
Two factors contributed to the increased immigration of Arabs after 1965. First, 
the quota system favoring European immigrants was abolished with the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act of 1965, and second, Israel's victory in the Six Day War created a 
chain reaction of displacement and unrest in the Middle East. The combination convinced 
record numbers of Arabs to leave the region and improve their lives in the United States as 
Figures 3-1 through 3-3 detaii.l8 
Most displaced Palestinians fled to neighboring Arab countries but a substantial 
number decided to join relatives in the United States. The Palestinians that migrated to the 
countries created border disturbances and displaced the native populations. Increased 
military skirmishes and urbanization pressures convinced some Lebanese and Jordanians to 
leave. Lebanese migration was also affected by a civil war and subsequent Israeli 
invasions ofthe country. (S Abraham 1983) 
18 The differences in the countries included in Figure 3-3 is due to a change in the Immigration 
and Naturalization Services' (INS) method of immigrant classification. From 1986 on, the INS added the 
categories Other Asian and Other African and deleted a number of smaller countries. 
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The Chaldeans began their exodus after the 1968 Iraqi regime change. They did 
not face direct persecution from the new government but found themselves caught in the 
Iraqi Kurds battle for autonomy. The Iran-Iraq war added substantially to the pressure to 
migrate. 
With the exception of the Y emenis fleeing military occupation and an ongoing civil 
war, Arabs departing countries on the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa did not 
encounter such dramatic push factors. They were more likely pulled to the United States 
for economic and educational reasons. (S Abraham 1983) 
Recently, the Middle East has been relatively peaceful but a number of Arab 
countries have been on the verge of economic and political collapse. Pushed by internal 
unrest and pulled by the lure of American prosperity, over 20,000 Arab immigrants 
continue to arrive annually in the United States. 
One in four immigrants arriving since 1990 is Lebanese. Egyptians and 
Palestinians each comprise 20 percent ofthe annual total. Following the GulfWar, Iraqi 
immigration has jumped to 15 percent. The remaining 20 percent is split between Syrians 
and Other Arabs. 19 
Geographic concentrations of the Arab-Americans have developed. The largest 
population exists in California with substantial numbers of Arab-Americans living in the 
Los Angeles basin and the San Francisco Bay Area. New York is a close second, and the 
third largest Arab-American population is in the state ofMichigan. These states alone 
19 Appendix A includes immigration statistics from 1869 to 1994. 
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Figure 3-1. Arab Immigration from 1968 to 1985. After Orfalea 
1988. 
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Figure 3-2. Origins Of Arab-Immigrants, 1968-94. After Orfalea 1988 and INS. 
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Figure 3-3. Arab Immigration from 1986 to 1994. After INS. 
are home to one third of all Aral>-Americans. A breakdown of Arab-American population 
by state and nationality is included in Appendix C. 
The Detroit metropolitan area has the largest concentration of Arab-Americans. 
The Detroit community started to grow with the birth of the auto industry and death of 
peddling. Unskilled immigrant workers flocked to the auto plants for the high wages and 
set hours. (Naff 1994) 
Distinct residential patterns exist within the Detroit area. Arab-American 
neighborhoods reflect religious and national homogeneity that extends as deep as town of 
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origin and religious sect. The population density ofthe Arab-Americans varies through 
out the city. Muslims, however, are concentrated in three of the four most densely 
populated areas and the Arab Christians are more likely to be dispersed in the suburbs. In 
addition, "some communities function as 'primary' receiving areas for new immigrants and 
feed into the development of other areas." (S Abraham 1983) Once financially and 
culturally secure, the new immigrants "spillover'' into neighboring districts. (S Abraham 
1983) 
The Arab-Americans have settled exclusively in urban areas: over 48 percent of · 
the Arab-American population can be found in twenty major cities. New York City and 
Los Angeles possess the second and third highest populations of Arab-Americans. Figure 
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Figure 3-4. Ten States with the Highest Arab-American Population. 
After Bureau of the Census 1990 CP-3-2. 
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Metropolitan Area Arab-American Percentage of Total Arab-
Population American Population 
Detroit 61065 7.0 
New York City 58347 6.7 
Los Angeles 56345 6.5 
Washington DC 28148 3.2 
Chicago 26770 3.1 
Boston 22391 . 2.6 
Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA 15662 1.8 
Bergen-Passaic, NJ 15580 1.8 
Houston 15389 1.8 
Cleveland 14005 1.6 
San Diego 13055 1.5 
Pittsburgh 12141 1.4 
San Francisco 11973 1.4 
Miami 11344 1.3 
Philadelphia 10345 1.2 
Riverside-San Bernardino, 10291 1.2 
CA 
Nassau-Suffolk NY 8837 1.0 
Oakland 8668 1.0 
Minneapolis- St Paul 8155 0.9 
Phoenix 7719 0.9 
Table 3-1. The 20 Cities with the Highest Arab-American Population. After 
Bureau ofthe Census 1990 CP-2-1. 
34 
C. SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF ARAB-AMERICANS 
1. Nationalities 
The Arab-American community echoes the national diversity of the Arab world 
and immigrants from every Arab country are present in the United States. The Arab-
American population, however, consists primarily of five nationalities. In order of size 
they are the Lebanese, Syrians, Egyptians, Palestinians, and Iraqis.20 Figure 3-5 









Figure 3-5. Composition of the Arab-American Community by Nationality. After 
Bureau of the Census 1990 CP-3-2. 
20 The remaining nationalities are consolidated under the label Other. They include persons 
from the Arabian Peninsula countries of Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the 
United Arab Emirates and the North African countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, and 
Djibouti. 
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2. Gender and Age 
The gender and age composition of the Arab-Americans reflects their status as a 
newer immigrant group.2I Males comprise 54 percent of the Arab-American population, 
five percent higher than the U.S. average. In addition, the median age of Arab-Americans 
at 30.2 is 1.8 years younger than national median. The male to female ratio and the 
median age of Arab-Americans varies with nationality. The Syrians and Lebanese, who 
have the longest presence in the United States, possess the lowest ratios and highest 
median ages. Gender and age statistics are summarized in Table 3-2. 
Nationality Total Population Males Females Male to Female Median Age 
Sex Ratio 
Egyptian 73097 42424 30673 138.3 31.7 
Iraqi 20657 11854 8803 134.7 30.3 
Lebanese 309578 161776 147802 109.5 32.3 
Palestinian 44651 26224 18427 142.3 27.1 
Syrian 95155 49023 46132 106.3 33.7 
Other 173253 104291 68962 151.2 25.9 
Table 3-2. Gender and Age Statistics of Arab-Americans. After Bureau of the 
Census 1990 CP-3-2. 
3. Nativity and Citizenship 
The majority of Arab-Arriericans were born in the United States, yet only the 
Lebanese and Syrian nationalities have larger American born than foreign born 
populations. The Egyptians, Iraqis, Palestinians, and Other Arab communities are 
dominated by foreign born members. This comes as no surprise considering the 
immigration of Arabs other than Syrians and Lebanese commenced after World War II. 
21 Seventy-five percent of foreign born Arab-Americans arrived in the United States after 1964. 
The gender and age composition of the community reflect the universal immigration pattern of males and 
younger persons being the most likely to migrate. 
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Ofthe foreign born Arab-Americans, 49 percent have become U.S. citizens, with 
the rate of naturalization directly related to date of arrival in the United States: 79 percent 
of immigrants arriving before 1980 have become citizens as compared to 21 percent of the 
1980 to1990 arrivals. Table 3-3 details the Arab-American nativity and citizenship 
statistics and Figure 3-6 highlights the different composition of the American and foreign 
born populations. 
Group American Foreign Entered US Entered US Naturalized Nota 
Born Born 1980-1990 before 1980 Citizen Citizen 
Egyptian 22541 50556 25234 25322 28540 22016 . 
Iraqi 6296 14359 6336 8023 7543 6816 
Lebanese 230736 78842 38602 40240 40150 38692 
Palestinian 19252 25399 11487 13912 14630 10769 
Syrian 72829 22226 11366 10860 11047 11179 
Other 72921 100332 57335 42997 40886 59446 
Total 424575 291714 150360 141354 142796 148918 
Table 3-3. Nativity and Citizenship Statistics by Nationality. After Bureau of the 
Census 1990 CP-3-2. 
4. Educational Attainment 
The overwhelming majority, 82.4 percent, of Arab-Americans22 complete high 
school and over one third of those persons later receive an undergraduate degree or 
higher. Both percentages are considerably greater than the national averages of75.2 and 
20.3, respectively. 
Within the community, educational success or failure has a strong correlation23 to 
gender and place ofbirth. Only 78.7 percent of Arab-American women and 78.8 percent 
offoreign born Arab-Americans complete high school. 
22 Educational attainment is computed for those persons 25 years or older. 
23 Any mention of correlation or impact of gender, nationality, place of birth, or year of arrival in 


















Figure 3-6. Composition of the Arab-American Community by Nativity. 
After Bureau of the Census 1990 CP-3-2. 
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The statistics make it impossible to discern the educational attainment of specific 
generations. For example, the question how many lower educated members of the third 
wave are sending their children to college must remain unanswered. An interesting fact 
did emerge while researching the question: Arab-American children attend private24 
schools at a higher rate than the national average. Perhaps a reflection of their relative 
affluence, attempts at cultural preservation, or commitment to quality education, 19 
percent of Arab-American students attend private elementary or high schools. The 
national figure, is a mere nine percent. 
5. Language Abilities 
When the English capabilities of the community are examined, it is apparent an 
overwhelming majority of Arab-Americans, regardless of generation, obtain English 
competency. English proficiency varies with place of birth and year of arrival. The 
significant difference in competency25 between American born and foreign born persons is 
illustrated in Figure 3-7. The census data also indicated increased English capabilities 
corresponded to increased time spent in the United States. As Figure 3-8 demonstrates, 
the ability to speak English "very well" was more prevalent in Arab-Americans arriving 
before 1980 than those arriving between 1980 and 1990. 
24 The data does not distinguish between secular and parochial schools. 
25 According to Census Bureau procedure, persons indicating they spoke a language other than 
English were then questioned on their perceived ability to speak English and place themselves in one of 
the following categories: "Very Well," "Well," "Not Well," or "Not at All." 
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The number of Arab-Americans living in Linguistically Isolated Households26 
(LIH) follows the same pattern. American born persons are less likely to live in an LIH 
than an Arab immigrant, and an inverse relationship exists between the number of 
immigrants residing in LIHs and the number of years an immigrant lived in the United 
States. Again, Figures 3-7 and 3-8 portray the trend. 
6. Labor Force Statistics 
Two-thirds of Arab-Americans over the age of 16 are members of the workforce 
with six percent remaining unemployed. Although both percentages are within one point 
of the national average, closer examination reveals startling variation in the occupational 
distribution of the Arab-Americans and the aggregate U.S. population. The pie charts in 
Figure 3-9 illustrate the differences. Over one-third of Arab-Americans are considered 
managers or professionals while barely a quarter of the overall population occupy 
equivalent positions. Arab-Americans are also more likely to be employed in technical, 
sales, and administrative vocations. Relatively few Arab-Americans are active in the . 
service, agriculture, and production and labor sectors. 
26 A linguistically isolated household is defined by the Census Bureau as "a household in which 
no person age 14 years or over speaks only English and no person age 14 years or over who speaks a 
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Figure 3-8. English Speaking Capabilities of Arab Immigrants. 
After Bureau of the Census 1990 CP-3-2. 
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Arab-American occupations vary by location. Chicago and Detroit have the 
highest proportion ofblue collar workers. In fact, 16 percent ofDetroit Arab-Americans 
are involved with production compared to the Arab-American aggregate of7.5 percent. 
At just under 23 percent, the metropolitan areas of Washington D.C. and Anaheim have 
the largest percentage of executives. Further variations of Arab-American careers by 
metro area are detailed in Table 3-4. 
Metropolitan Professional Retail/ Administrative Service Executivet 
Area Sales Support Managerial 
Detroit 6.8% 12.3% 12.3% 7.2% 8.9% 
New York City 11.1% 15.2% 15.2% 7.3% 15.4% 
Los Angeles 14.8% 11.8% 11.8% 5.0% 12.0% 
Washington 18.0% 13.3% 13.3% 5.2% 22.9% 
D.C. 
Chicago 10.5% 14.5% 12.9% 5.4% 6.2% 
Boston 14.7% 11.8% 12.6% 9.9% 17.6% 
Anaheim, CA 6.5% 23.8% 15.0% 2.9% 22.5% 
Bergen- 13.4% 10.6% 15.6% 7.2% 14.9% 
Passaic, NJ 
Houston 18.2% 14.7% 9.1% 7.8% 14.6% 
Cleveland 12.5% 19.9% 9.9% 11.7% 7.4% 
Table 3-4. The Top Five Occupations for Arab-Americans in the Top Ten 
Metropolitan Areas. From El-Badry 1994. 
7. Income Levels 
An analysis of income levels revealed the relative affluence of Arab-Americans 
compared to national average. The mean income of Arab-American families of$53,337 is 
almost $10,000 higher than national mean of$43,803. The difference can not be 
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Figure 3-9. Comparison of Occupational Distribution. After Bureau of the Census 
1990 CP-3-2 
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explained away by larger families with more contributors, per capita incomes of Arab-
Americans are also higher, $17,348 compared to $14,420.27 
Within the community, families with an American born head of the household are 
more financially secure than their foreign born counterparts. Yet, as Figure 3-10 
illustrates, the converse was true for individuals. Arab-Americans are not immune to 
economic hardship. Eleven percent of families, one point higher than the national average, 
and 26 percent of unrelated individuals, two points higher than the national average, live 
below the poverty level_28 Despite the high rate of impoverishment, only 5.3 percent of · 
the families receive public assistance. 
Poverty levels and .public assistance vary with nationality and place of birth as 
Figure 3-11 depicts. Nationality has no discernible impact on income and poverty levels, 
but plays a determining role in whether a family receives public assistance. Over nine 
percent oflraqis receive government aid, followed by 6.6 percent of Other Arabs. The 
remainder of the nationalities have between 4.5 and 5.9 percent of their families receiving 
public assistance. Except for the Egyptians, immigrants collect government aid in numbers 
higher than their American born counterparts. 
27 Labor statistics also reveal the national percentage for having two or more workers in the 
family is two points higher than the Arab-American percentage. 
28 For the 1990 Census, poverty thresholds dependent on the number and age of family members 
were established. Each Arab-American family's income was compared against the appropriate threshold 
to determine what percentage lived in poverty. 
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Figure 3-10. Income Levels of Persons of Arab Ancestry. After 
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Figure 3-ll. Economic Hardship of Arab American Families. 
After Bureau of the Census 1990 CP-3-2. 
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Despite what the poverty statistics suggested about more recent arrivals being in 
greater financial need, a higher percentage of immigrants coming before 1980 accepted 
public assistance than those who arrived after 1980. 
D. PROFILE OF ARAB IMMIGRANTS ARRIVING BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990 
The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 did more than abolish unfair 
quotas; it opened the floodgates for unskilled immigrants to enter the United States. The 
act altered the demographics of the United States and the Arab-American community. 
Recent Arab immigrants have lower income levels, higher poverty levels, and higher 
unemployment than their predecessors and the average American. Surprisingly, their 
education levels are higher than the Arab-American and American aggregate and the 
occupations they fill parallel their Arab-American predecessors. Table 3-5 and Figures 3-
12 and 3-13 summarize the economic and social standing ofthe newest Arab-American 
arrivals. 
Arab-Americans Arab-American National 
Arriving btwn Aggregate Aggregate 
1980-1990 
Mean Family Income $35,397 $53,337 $43,803 
Per Capita Income $12,339 $17,348 $14,420 
Living below the 22.1% 10.9%, 10% 
Poverty Level 
Completed High School 82.5% 82.4% 75.2% 
Completed BA/BS or Higher 43.6% 36.3% 20% 
Receiving Public Assistance 4.2% 5.3% 7.5% 
Unemployed 8.6% 5.9"/o 6.3% 
Median Age 28.8 years 30.2 years 33 years 
Male to Female Ratio 175.9 123.3 95 
Table 3-5. Comparison of Arab-American Immigrants to the Arab-American and 
National Average. After Bureau of the Census 1990 CP-2-1 and CP-3-2. 
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Figure 3-12. Composition of the Arab-American Immigrants Arriving Between 
















Figure 3-13. Occupational Distribution of Arab-Americans Arriving Between 1980 
and 1990. After Bureau of the Census 1990 CP-3-2. 
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E. COMPARISION OF ARAB-AMERICANS TO OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS 
To place the Arab-American data within perspective, certain statistics were 
compared with other ethnic groups. The selected groups represent European, Asian, and 
Hispanic ancestries. 28 All Persons, the Census Bureau label for the national aggregate, 
American Indians, and African Americans are also included. 
As Table 3-6 indicates, the Arab-Americans consistently place in the top half of the 
rankings and within one or two places of All Persons.29 Their language skills are higher 
than their Asian30 counterparts and the Hispanic representatives. They lag behind other 
Asian groups for educational attainment, but still remain in the above the fiftieth 
percentile. The same is true for the economic comparisons. 
28 Asian ancestries may appear to be over represented, however, the inclusion of Indians and 
Iranians was necessary because Americans confuse the groups with Arabs on a routine basis. 
29 Graphs for each category are provided in Appendix D. 
30 Although a number of Arabs are from North Africa, the language and culture originated in 
Southwest Asia. 
50 
Does Not Living in Less than a Completed 
Speak English Linguistically 5th Grade Completed BNBS or 
Ethnicity Very Well Isolated Education High School Higher 
Household 
African 2 2 8 11 10 
American 
All Persons 4 5 5 8 8 
American 5 4 9 . 10 12 
Indian 
Arab 6 6 6 6 4 
Chinese 12 12 11 9 3 
German 1 1 1 5 6 
Indian 7 7 7 4 1 
Iranian 9 9 3 1 2 
Italian 3 3 3 78 7 
Japanese 8 8 2 3 5 
Mexican 11 11 13 14 13 
Puerto Rican 10 10 10 13 11 
Vietnamese 13 13 12 12 9 
Mean Family Per Capita Families Unemployment Receive 
Income Income Below the Rate Public 
Ethnicity Poverty Level Assistance 
African 11 9 11 12 11 
American 
All Persons 8 8 5 8 7 
American 12 12 12 13 10 
Indian 
. 
Arab 4 5 7 6 6 
Chinese 5 7 8 3 8 
German 7 6 3 2 2 
Indian 1 3 4 5 3 
Iranian 3 2 6 7 5 
Italian 6 4 2 4 3 
Japanese 2 1 1 1 1 
Mexican 10 13 9 10 9 
Puerto Rican 13 11 13 11 13 
Vietnamese 9 10 10 9 12 
Table 3-6. Ranking of Cultural and Economic Indicators by Selected Ethnic 
Groups, 1 being the highest and thirteen the lowest. After Bureau of the Census 
1990 CP-2-1 and CP-3-2. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Combining the migration profile of the first and second wave in Chapter II with 
this chapter's data, it is possible to contrast the composition and motivations of the three 
waves. Table 3-7 encapsulates those differences. Despite the increased variation in 
nationality of the immigrants, the largest group to arrive from Lebanon. Present 
immigration statutes favor family chain migration and the Lebanese have the largest 
community of potential sponsors. 
Arab-American settlement mirrors the settlement pattern of all recent immigrants. 
A majority reside in metropolitan areas in one of six states: California, New York, Texas, 
Florida, New Jersey, and illinois. (Morgan 1995) Substantial Arab-American enclaves 
also exist in Michigan, Ohio, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. The Detroit area has the 
highest concentration of Arab-Americans and within its confines exist distinct 
neighborhoods reflecting the religious and national heterogeneity of the Arab-Americans. 
The average Arab-American has a higher education and is more likely to be a 
professional or manager than the average American. They are also less likely to work in 
the service sector or be laborers. The Arab-American income level reflect their white 
collar status and their mean family income is $10,000 higher than the national average. 
However, the community's poverty levels also exceed the national statistics. This 
disparity indicates Arab-American class distribution is more stratified than the American 
population's. 
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First Wave Second Wave Third Wave 
(1860-1946) (1946-196 7) (1967-Present) 
Push Factors • Economic • Social and Political • War 
Depression Instability • Economic Hardship 
• Social and Political 
Instability 
Pull Factors • Economic • Economic • Economic 
Opportunity Opportunity Opportunity 
• Education • Family Unification 
• Social and Political I 
Freedom 
Demographic • Lebanese and Syrian • All Nationalities • All Nationalities 
Composition • Single Males • Single Males • Males and Females. 
• Christian • More Muslims than • More Muslims than 
• Uneducated Christians Christians 
• Educated • Uneducated & 
Educated 
Table 3-7. Summary of Arab Immigration Waves. After S Abraham 1989, Karpat 
1985, Elkholy 1969, and NatT 1994. 
The newer immigrants, those Arabs arriving between 1980 and 1990, have lower 
incomes and higher poverty rates than the Arab-American and national aggregates. They 
do, however, have higher percentages for high school and college completion and 
resemble the Arab-American occupational distribution with two-thirds filling either 
managerial, professional, technical, or administrative positions. 
The comparison of the Arab-Americans to other ethnic groups revealed the 
community to be competitive in economic and cultural statistics. They ranked no lower 




IV. CULTURAL IDENTITY OF THE ARAB-AMERICANS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Numbers alone can not provide a complete portrait of the Arab-Americans. From 
the Americanization debate in the Syrian World to today's battle for mosque domination, 
the community has struggled to define its cultural identity. The balance between 
assimilation and preservation depends not only on the immigrant, but on the society left 
behind, and the society entered. Empowered by the increased global importance of the 
Middle East, encouraged by the transformation of the United States into a multicultural 
nation, and repulsed by the moral decay in modem society, descendants of the pioneers 
and current immigrants have made a concerted effort to resurrect and preserve Arab 
traditions in the United States. This chapter summarizes the evolution and present status 
of Arab-American cultural identity and institutions. 
B. IDENTITY 
Upon arrival in the United States immigrants have three choices for coping with 
. 
their heritage. The first, ethnic denial, involves the deliberate deemphasis of one's culture. 
The immigrant's goal is to go unnoticed in the new society. Ethnic isolation, the second 
option, is a based upon an immigrant's desire to remain within one's own culture. Such a 
decision may be based upon an assumption that American culture is incompatible and 
inferior to the immigrant's own or something as simple as age, older immigrants may feel 
it is too difficult or time consuming to learn a new language and adopt new traditions. In 
either case, the result is the same: the establishment of cultural safehavens and the 
detachment of entire communities from the American mainstream. Lastly, there is ethnic 
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integration. A reconciliatory approach, it stresses the similarities between the two cultures 
while demanding the recognition of the legitimacy of the foreign culture. (N Abraham 
1989) 
At the individual level, a person is capable of employing all three strategies 
depending on the situation. However, at the community level, one approach to 
assimilation dominates. The community choice is largely determined by their perception 
of themselves, their perception of the host culture, and the host culture's perception of 
them (N Abraham 1989) 
As mentioned in Chapter II, the pioneer Arab-Americans adopted the strategy of 
ethnic denial and the second wave were predominantly integrationists. Cultural 
integration continues to be the strategy of choice for Arab-Americans today. 
Israel's total victory in the 1967 War and the anti-Arab backlash in the media had a 
sobering effect on the Arab-American community. Before the war, American-born Arabs 
and the recent immigrants did not interact or recognize that they shared a common 
heritage. The hostility towards Arabs united them in an effort to counter American 
misconceptions and ensure the preservation of Arab culture. 
The first noticeable effect of the cultural coalition was an increase in mosque 
attendance and construction. A rise in the interest oflearning and teaching Arabic 
accompanied the Islamic revival. Not be outdone, a number of the Eastern orthodox 
churches began to offer language and history classes. Those Arab-Americans who chose 
not to express their ethnicity in religious terms still participated in the Arab renaissance by 
taking Arabic classes at college or joining social clubs. 
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Arab-Americans took their culture outside the community for the first time. 
Concerted efforts to educate the American public about Arab heritage and Islam, to alter 
the depiction of Arabs in history texts, and to document the Arab-American experience 
began. 
The Arab renaissance has been facilitated by a fundamental shift in American 
society. Today's multicultural America does not pressure ethnic groups to assimilate. 
Instead, affirmative action and similar programs reward communities able to maintain their 
cultural authenticity: "Racial preference entitlements and multicultural ideology 
encourage them to retain their distinct ethnic and racial identities." (Lind 1995) 
The majority of American and foreign born Arabs seem to have reached an 
agreement on the usefulness of a blanket identity to increase Arab cultural and political 
legitimacy. The Arab-American hyphenate may not represent all Arab-Americans all of 
the time, but it does serve two purposes. First, it stresses the similarities and compatibility 
of American and Arab culture and second, it provides an air oflegitimacy to and a voice 
with which to demand recognition for the Arab minority. (Sulieman 1994) 
A small minority, however, maintain distinction by refusing to adopt the Arab-
American label. The most prevalent is the Palestinians. Since their diaspora after the 
1948 creation oflsrael, the Palestinians have maintained a strong national identity. It does 
not matter whether the Palestinian was born in Jordan, Kuwait, America, or another host 
country, they maintain their primary identity as Palestinians and declare themselves as 
such. (S Abraham 1983) 
Another recent trend is a by-product oflslamic fundamentalism in the Middle East. 
New immigrants have begun to identify themselves as Muslims. Arab culture and country 
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of origin are overshadowed by their strict adherence to Islamic practices. (S Abraham 
1983) 
Usually poor and uneducated Muslims, these immigrants are shocked by America's 
value system, or in their view, America's lack of a value system.. They believe they must 
maintain a separate identity or risk the corruption of their faith. This belief is reinforced 
by the Muslim clerics that have accompanied the third wave. (Naff 1983) The Muslim 
isolationists justify their separateness with " ... a posture of intensified "Islamic Pride and a 
belief in the merit of the Islamization ofNorth America." (Abu-Laban 1989) 
C. LANGUAGE 
"Language is the glue that binds all Arabs together, transcending religious, tribal, 
and regional differences." (Drysdale and Blake 1988) The second and third waves 
recognize the importance of the transmission of Arabic to preserving Arab culture. A 
working knowledge of Arabic is vital to practicing Muslims. 31 Additionally, contact with 
the homeland is more direct and frequent and having grandchildren able to communicate 
with grandparents is a real concern. 
The community press and organizations have aided in the teaching of Arabic to 
second and third generation Arab-Americans. Their efforts have met with limited success. 
A difficult language to learn, only the most rudimentary skills can be taught in afterschool 
sessions and the instructors must compete with more "normal" activities such as sports 
and video games. 
31 The Quran is available only in Arabic. English interpretations are not considered comparable 
replacements for the Arabic text because the Quran is the word of God and crucial elements of His 
message may be lost or altered in translation. For the same reason, the Quran may not be altered to reflect 
different Arabic dialects and is the standard for the language. 
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The graph in Figure 4-1 compares the number of Arab-Americans to the number of 
Arabic speakers in the ten states with the highest Arab-American populations.33 The 
disparity between the numbers speaks for itself; half the community is incapable of 
speaking the language that defines it. The inability to teach Arabic to American born 
generations is even more apparent with the realization 41 percent of Arab-Americans are 























































Figure 4-1. Arabic Speaking Abilities of the Arab-American Community. 
After Bureau of the Census 1990 CP-2-1. 
D. RELIGION 
Arab-American heterogeneity is not limited to differences in nationality. The 
community is also split religiously between Islam and Christianity. Unlike the Arab 
33 Appendix E contains the number of Arab-Americans and Arabic speakers in all 50 states. 
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World, Arab Christians outnumber Arab Muslims in the United States.34 The Arab-
Americans are further divided within the religions. The Druze, Sufis, and Sunnis are the 
primary sects present in the Muslim community and the Christians are subdivided first into 
Protestant and Eastern Orthodox and then by specific denomination. 
1. Arab-American Muslims 
Muslim emigration from Dar ai-Islam, the House oflslam, to Dar ai-Harb, the 
House ofWar, is new to the history of the religion. Scholar Bernard Lewis explains in his 
essay "Muslim Populations Under Non-Muslim Rule" (1993): 
For such an action by Muslims, there is no precedent in Islamic 
history, no previous discussion in Islamic legal literature ... the possibility 
never seems to have entered their minds that a Muslim would voluntarily 
leave a Muslim land in order to place himself in this predicament...A mass 
migration -a reverse hijra- of ordinary people seeking a new life among the 
unbelievers is an entirely new phenomenon .... 
For a practicing Muslim to leave the security of the Muslim world and risk losing 
his faith is serious matter. According to the Quran, to forsake Islam is punishable by 
death (Lewis 1993). Potential emigrants were strongly discouraged from migrating out of 
fear they would be unable to maintain their faith in Christian societies (Haddad 1983; Naff 
1994) Some scholars would have found no comfort in U. S. laws allowing Muslims to 
practice unimpeded, the risk of apostasy was still present and actually heightened with the 
increased tolerance (Lewis 1993). 
34 No definitive statistics exist on the Christian-Muslim split of the community. Ratio estimates 
range from 4:1 to 1:1. That the predominantly Christian Lebanese, Syrians, and Iraqis comprise 60 
percent of the community indicates Christians still outnumber the Muslims. 
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A minority of recent immigrants have begun a reform movement to return the 
Americanized mosques35 to more traditional practices. "A coalition between illiterate 
traditional rural men and highly educated young students or immigrants committed to a 
strict Islamic has formed, and ... appears to be operative in 'wresting the leadership of the 
mosque' away from those who labored long to bring it into being." (Haddad 1983) The 
Islamic conservatives are supported by a new generation of overseas mosque leadership 
including the Muslim World League (MWL). The MWL has sponsored the formation of 
an American Council of the Masjid to provide economic assistance and spiritual guidance' 
to mosques in an attempt to curb the "deviant" tendencies oflslam in the United States 
(Haddad 1983). 
The MWL's primary allies in the effort to resurrect traditional Islam is the Muslim 
Student Association (MSA). Formed at the University oflllinois, Urbana, in 1963, the 
MSA has maintained direct ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaati Islam since 
its inception. The members have dedicated themselves to promoting pure and true Islam 
in the United States. 
The MWL and MSA effolis to revert mosques to Arab cultural practices have 
been unsuccessful for two reasons. First is the adoption of Sunni Muslim practices by the 
majority ofthe members ofthe Nation oflslam in 1975. African Americans are the largest 
ethnic group within American Islam Their interpretations oflslam and the role of the 
mosque reflect their American experiences and coincide with the evolution of the religion 
to resemble the American Protestant standard. (Dart 1995; Haddad 1994) 
35 The Americanization of the mosques is covered in Chapter II. 
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The second reason recent Arab immigrants are not succeeding in reasserting 
cultural dominance within the mosques is the arrival of non-Arab Muslims in record 
numbers to the United States. Primarily Pakistanis, Iranians, and Indians, the new arrivals 
reject efforts to define Islam strictly in an Arab framework. In fact, Indo-Pakistanis 
outnumber the Arab-American Muslims and comprise the second largest ethnic group 
within the religion.36 (Haddad 1994; NPR 1995) 
Whether they choose to adhere to the Americanized or the Arab version, Arab-
Americans who practice Islam in the United States will always encounter difficulties. The 
fundamental tenets of Islam, monotheism and submission to Allah's will, are intellectually 
compatible with the dominant Judea-Christian society. Conflict arises, however, in the 
day to day adherence to Islam Work schedules, insufficient facilities, and fear of public 
ridicule prevent Muslims from completing their five daily prayers and attending Friday 
prayer services. Muslim employees and students also have difficulties observing Islamic 
holidays. For example, during the month of Ramadan Muslims are required to fast daily. 
In countries with Islamic majorities, office hours and workloads are adjusted to reflect the 
people's decreased energy levels~ Such accommodation is unheard of in the United States. 
Additionally, Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha,37 the two holiest days for Muslims are not 
recognized holidays. 
36 A 1994 survey of active mosques in North America revealed 70 percent of mosques are multi-
ethnic. African Americans attend in the largest numbers, followed by Indo-Pakistani immigrants and, 
finally, Arab-Americans. (Dart 1995) 
37 Eid al-Fitr is celebrated at the end ofRamadan and Eid al-Adha marks the annual end of the 
Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca. 
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The conflicts between Islam and American society go beyond the calendar. Islam 
has strict dietary laws that prohibit the ingestion of alcohol, pork, and improperly 
slaughtered meats. To be fit for consumption, meat must be halal, from an animal 
butchered and bled "with the name of God recited at the time of slaughtering" (Haddad 
1983) Obtaining halal meats is difficult outside of urban areas and the majority ofMuslims 
have no access to properly prepared meat.38 
Islam also dictates a dress code for women. Although a number of interpretations 
of the requirements exist, there is a bare minimum: loose fitting clothing with only the 
hands and face visible and a hijab to cover the hair. Muslim women who adhere to the 
dress code face public ridicule and discrimination. Not until recently have employers 
recognized a woman's right to dress in accordance with Islamic guidelines.39 
Lastly, Islam is an authoritarian religion. It dictates all aspects of a Muslim's life. 
To be fully realized, a theocratic state is required. The laws that govern Muslims are 
derived from the Quran or the life ofMohammed. Muslims that choose to live in the 
United States must do so in accordance with American civil laws. Islamic and American 
law conflict in number of areas ninging from divorce to family inheritances. Because it is 
unlikely American courts will make allowances for or recognize the validity oflslamic law, 
Muslims will have to "accept judgments that contradict the will of God." (Haddad 1983) 
38 Some Muslims have found compromises to overcome the difficulty of obtaining halal meats. 
They may butcher their own animals, buy from the more prevalent Kosher butchers, or abstain from meat 
altogether and become vegetarians. 
39 In late 1995, two women, one California the other in Virginia, were reinstated at their jobs 
after being fired for wearing their hijabs. The companies involved apologized for their ignorance and 
promised to hold sensitivity training. (CAIR 1995) 
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Despite the incompatibility oflslamic and American culture, Arab-Americans 
wishing to maintain their faith have the greatest chance for success today. Islam has 
become the fastest growing religion in the United States. Eighty percent of the existing 
mosques have been built in the last 25 years (Dart 1995) and the number of American 
Muslims is estimated to have been increasing by 100,000 a year since the early eighties 
due to conversions, irrunigration, and procreation. (Haddad 1983) 
Of the 1046 total mosques or masjids in the United States, only 948 hold Friday 
prayer sessions. The average attendance at the Friday prayers is 173 Muslims. Table 4-r 
documents mosque attendance the top metropolitan areas in North America and Figure 4-
2 details the number of mosques in those regions. Note that Detroit, the city with the 
largest Arab-American population, ranks eighth for mosque attendance. 
The number ofMuslims participating, 486,390, falls dramatically short of the 
estimated five to seven million Muslims living in the United States. Dr. Ihsan Bagby, who 
directed the most comprehensive survey of mosque demographics to date, estimates for 
every Muslim attending the prayer meeting, there are ten who do not.40 ffiirectmy 1994) 
In addition to the mosques, Islamic schools have been founded to provide Muslim 
children with religious education, temptation free environments, and social reinforcement. 
Appendix F lists the distribution of mosques and Islamic schools by state. A small mail 
order industry producing Islamic materials for children and adults has developed to serve 
those Muslims not living near or not desiring to attend the mosques or 
40 As stated earlier, to be a faithful Muslim does not require participation in a mosque. 
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City Number of Number Holding Average Total Attendance 
Mosques Friday Prayer Attendance 
New York 98 94 292 27,448 
Southern California 55 49 242 11,858 
Chicago 60 58 180 10,440 
Washington DC 31 28 300 8,400 
Toronto 16 16 449 7,184 
San Francisco 37 34 203 6,902 
North New Jersey 39 35 181 6,335 
Detroit 32 30 183 5,490 
Houston 22 21 228 4,788 
Philadelphia 25 22 137 3,014 
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Figure 4-2. Top Ten Metropolitan Areas for Mosque Distribution. After Directory 
1994. 
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schools. The companies, mosques, and schools are further reinforced by a growing 
network oflslarnic organizations. The organizations range in purpose from charity and 
missionary work to professional networking. Figure 4-3 provides a break down of 
Muslim organizations by purpose. 
Most significant is the recent growth of umbrella organizations to unify the Islamic 
community and provide a voice for Islamic concerns in American political and cultural 
debates. The largest, the Islamic Society ofNorth America, is affiliated with 40 percent of 
established mosques. Another 20 percent follow the leadership oflmam W. Deen 
Mohammed, who led the African-American community away from the Nation oflslam to 
Sunni Islam The remainder ofthe mosques are not affiliated. (Dart 1995) 
2. Arab-American Christians 
The majority of Arab-American Christians belong to Eastern Apostolic churches. 
Affiliation with the churches has been and continues to be a focal point for social 
interaction. As Chapter II explains, the congregations have not been unaffected by their 
transplantation into Protestant America. Their history of survival under extreme 
persecution in their homelands and ability to adapt to the needs of the parishioners indicate 
the churches will continue to thrive in the United States. Table 4-2 summarizes 


















Figure 4-3. Muslim Organizations by Purpose. After 
Directory 1994. 
Church Christoloey Rite Parishes 
Antiochian Orthodox Chalcedonian 1 Byzantine 150 
Coptic Orthodox Monophysite2 Alexandrian 50 
Syrian Orthodox Monophysite Antiochian 28 
Maronite Monothelite3 Antiochian 43 
Chaldean Monophysite Chaldean 10 








Table 4-2. Eastern Churches in the United States. After Haddad 1994. 1Believes 
Christ's divinity equals his humanity. 2 Believes Christ's divinity supersedes his 
humanity. 3Believes Christ has one will but two natures: the human and the divine. 
In addition to the Eastern churches, there are approximately 1 00 Arabic speaking 
evangelical churches. One third of the congregations are Presbyterian sponsored and the 
remainder are members of the Southern Baptist Convention. According to one minister, 
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the churches play an invaluable role as "feeder Churches." After gaining the necessary 
English skills or intermarrying, the immigrants "move into American churches." (Haddad 
1994) 
A number of Arab-Americans attend non-evangelical Protestant churches. The 
typical Arab Episcopalian or Presbyterian learned English prior to immigrating and 
attended the same type of services in their homeland. The first arrivals at the tum of the 
century were products of the American missionary efforts. The Christianity the 
immigrants learned from the missionaries was more conservative and fundamentalist thari 
the religion practiced in the states. In addition to the ideological differences, the U.S. 
churches were extremely class and race conscious and as a result rejected the new arrivals. 
Separate congregations were established to accommodate the Arabs. (Haddad 1994) 
If the underlying racism that necessitated the formation of separate congregations 
were to disappear, it is doubtful the Arab-Americans would join the parishes. The Arab 
language churches have maintained a more conservative theology than their counterparts. 
The separate churches serve to isolate the community " ... from the breakdown of the 
Christian moral and ethical structure evident in the mainline denominations." (Haddad 
1994) The differences are perceived to have become so great the Arab clergy has 
condemned their American equivalents: "These American Presbyterians are not Christian. 
They are promiscuous, they believe in divorce, practice serial polygamy, welcome unwed 
mothers, and consider ordaining homosexual clergy in the church. This is unacceptable." 
(Haddad 1994) 
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E. SECULAR ORGANIZATIONS AND THE ARAB-AMERICAN MEDIA 
No event had a larger impact on the Arab-American community than the Arab 
defeat in 1967. The war and the anti-Arab sentiment it generated in the United States 
generated a defensive reflex from the Arab-Americans. Persons who had previously 
shrugged off their Arab ancestry were compelled to reassert cultural and political bonds 
within the United States and with their respective homelands. The organizations founded 
in the wake of the 1967 war intended to unite the community, preserve the Arab traditions 
within the community, and influence American attitudes toward Arab-Americans and their 
homelands. (Elkholy 1969; Naff1994; Suliernan 1994) 
Today, Arab-American organizations remain vital to survival ofthe community. 
Thousands of organizations exist at the local, regional, and national level. Contributions 
of each wave of immigrants can be seen in the diversity of the organizations. Social and 
charitable goals are hold-overs from before the wars, political mobilization and community 
unification are post-1967 contributions. The diversity ofthe organizations is illustrated in 
Figure 4-4. 
In the 70's and 80's as the technology became available and the Arab-American 
audience grew, the press expanded into radio and television. Technology also permitted 
the media to expand its coverage of the Middle East and distribution of the material in the 
United States. Current Arab-American print media circulation is estimated at 700,000 a 
month, with 47 national publications and hundreds of newsletters. Figures 4-5 and 4-6 
break down the national publications by purpose and language. Television and radio 
programs estimate their combined audience at six million a month for over 250 hours of 
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Figure 4-6. Linguistic Distribution of the Arab-American Press. After Arab-
American Almanac 1994. 
F. POLffiCAL IDENTITY 
The democratic stability of the United States rests on the "recognition that ethnic 
identity and ethnically based political activity are fundamental features of the American 
landscape." (Cochran 1996) The American political system is predisposed to allow special 
interest groups access to the political process. That access is possible does not 
necessarily mean it is granted. Access is a function of"the group's strategical position in 
society." (Bard 1991) Strategic position is determined primarily by the group's authority 
in comparison with other groups and the compatibility of the group's agenda to the 
majority interest. Until recently, the Arab-Americans have not scored high in either 
category. 
Prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the oil embargo, the political atmosphere 
could best be described as "pro-Israeli" instead of"anti-Arab." The Energy Crisis, 
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followed by the Iranian Hostage Crisis, ushered in an era of politicians' supplementing 
their support for Israel with Arab bashing. (Suliernan 1988) Preying on anti-Arab 
sentiment, political candidates have used the Arab archetype as a scapegoat to bolster 
public support prior to elections and deflect criticism for policy choices. Politicians also 
rejected support from Arab-Americans and distanced themselves from "Arab" issues. 
The Arab-Americans realized their image was a political handicap during their first 
attempt to mobilize politically.41 The educated newer immigrants and the third generation 
of first wave immigrants formed the nucleus of Arab-American political activism, the 
Association of Arab American University Graduates (AAUG). Within weeks of inception, 
the AAUG realized the American political system was so over-saturated with anti-Arab 
hostility and pro-Israeli sentiment that obtaining significant political gains through 
traditional methods was impossible. In response, the AAUG adopted a two pronged 
approach of preaching cultural isolationism while focusing on a massive information effort 
about the Arab population both within the United States and abroad. (Shain 1995) 
The work of the AAUG was not enough to gain Arab-Americans political access. 
The rise of the petrodollar, how~ver, did enable Arab lobbies to increase their political 
clout.42 Unfortunately, the Arab gains did more damage than good for the politically 
41 Prior to 1967, the Arab-American community did not express political ambitions in the 
traditional sense. "Up to World War I, the main political activity of the Arab group was intersectarian 
and intracommunal ... sect was a substitute for and an embodiment ofthe community, country, and 
nation." (Sulieman 1994) Post-WW II participation in U.S. politics was limited to" ... voting, party 
membership, and some public or political service .... " (Sulieman 1994) 
42 It is important to differentiate between the Arab and the Arab-American lobbies. The Arab 
lobby is defined as those formal and informal elements attempting to establish American support for Arab 
interests in the Middle East. The Arab-American lobby is primarily concerned with U.S. national 
interests in the Middle East as well as the ethnic community's domestic financial, political, and cultural 
needs. The goals of the two lobbies have coincided and conflicted in the past. 
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active Arab-Americans. Americans felt betrayed by the politicians favoring Arab causes at 
their expense. They believed the money the Arabs used to gain influence in Washington 
came directly out of their pockets at the gas pumps. In addition, they also felt threatened 
by the economic strength of the OPEC nations and the increased investment of Middle 
East countries in the United States. 
The stereotype of the money dripping sheik reached its height with the Federal 
Bureau oflnvestigation's Operation ABSCAM. 42 The acceptance of the Arab sheik 
stereotype by politicians indicated a renewed effort to educate government officials about 
the true Arab-American identity was needed. Prominent Arab-American and former 
Senator James Abourezk founded the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee 
(ADC) in the wake of the ABSCAM scandal. The ADC has since been "actively engaged 
in documenting and challenging racism, bias, and stereotyping." (ADC 1995) 
Negative stereotyping is not the only reason for the Arab-American's political 
ineffectiveness. The high level of Jewish-American activism, made even more potent by 
the concentration of the Jewish population in critical election states, and the large financial 
contributions to election campaigns from the Jewish-American community make the 
Jewish-American lobby an attractive ally.43 Political affinity for pro-Israeli policy is 
bolstered by a perceived congruity between American and Israeli cultural values. After all, 
Israel is the only democratic·state in the Middle East, a region historically dominated by 
despots and autocrats. (Bard 1991) 
42 The 1978 sting operation involved fake Arab sheiks bribing government officials for 
immigration visas and building and gambling licenses. 
43 The Jewish-American lobby is surpassed only by the Anglo-American lobby as the most 
effective ethnic lobby in the United States. (DeConde 1992) 
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Despite an early tendency for the Arab-Americans to blame their failures solely on 
their Jewish counterparts, they have identified and begun to overcome their own 
shortcomings. First there is the size and composition of the community. The Arab-
American community is approximately half the size of the American Jewish population and 
is not nearly as politically organized. Unlike their Jewish-American counterparts, Arab-
Americans are not aligned with one political party. Some favor the Republican Party for 
its conservative values, while others prefer the Democrats for their willingness to 
recognize ethnic differences and address humanitarian issues. (Sulieman 1994; Samhan 
1988) They also lack substantial allies to compensate for the numerical differences. 
Fragile coalitions with other lobbies exist, but they are strictly issue driven. (Jabara 1989; 
Samhan 1989) 
Closely related to the size of the constituency is its composition. The Arab-
American community is multi-national. A majority originate from Lebanon with smaller 
portions of the population tracing their ancestry to Syria, Egypt, Morocco, Iraq, Jordan or 
any other of the states in the Arab world. As the originating states have conflicting 
priorities and interests, so do the Arab-Americans. Only on humanitarian issues, such as 
the 1982 invasion ofLebanon, Palestinian self-determination, and the United Nations' 
embargo oflraq, has the community reached a consensus. (Bard 1991) 
The Arab-American organizations must shoulder some of the responsibility for 
their ineffectiveness. Inter and intra organization competition, poor leadership, a failure to 
connect with the constituents it represents, a tendency to generate criticism instead of 
useful alternatives, and personality conflicts continue to plague their attempts to gain a 
political voice. (Jabara 1989; Orfalea 1989) 
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The Arab-Americans have gained considerable political ground since the late 
eighties. The turnaround can be attributed to several factors. The first is the 1985 
founding of the Arab American Institute (AAI) and its efforts to build the community into 
a political force. Increased Arab-American voter registration and participation in the 
political parties are the AAI' s major contributions. The recognition of AAI' s tenth 
anniversary by President Clinton and other national leaders44 affirmed the growing 
national importance of the AAI and Arab-Americans in politics. (Ferguson 1995; Zogby 
1995) 
Progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process also contributes to the political 
empowerment of the Arab-Americans. Author Yosii Shain (1995) explains the connection 
between the progress and Arab-Americans' perception of increased potentials for success 
and their corresponding willingness to participate politically : 
Arab American activists have long argued that their . exclusion radiates 
primarily from the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is a result, they claim of 
associating them with Americans' twisted images of their Arab and 
Palestinian compatriots in the Middle East. These activists also held the 
pro-Israeli lobby responsible for the lack of access to the American political 
system. Thus, Arab American integrationists have drawn a direct link 
between their domestic empowerment and the ebbing of the Middle East 
conflict. 
The connection between peace in the Middle East and the decrease in the "Arab 
stigma" is reinforced by events following the 1993 Israeli-PLO peace accords. AAI 
president James Zogby joined with Jewish-American leaders in "Builders for Peace," a 
President Clinton sponsored coalition for developing the West Bank and Gaza economy. 
44vice -president Gore, Democratic National Chairman Don Fowler, Senate Minority Leader 
Tome Daschle, Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna 
Shalala all addressed the conference. Over 20 members of Congress attended the event. 
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Also, the ADC refusal to endorse the accords led to sharp criticism and marginalization of 
the organization within the community. (Shain 1995) 
Finally, the Arab-Americans have also transformed their message from anti-Israel 
to pro-U.S .. By placing Arab-American concerns in a national interest context, the Arab-
American organizations have had greater success at bringing their "issues into the 
mainstream of American electoral politics." (Zogby 1995) The Palestinian quest for self-
determination has evolved from a narrow minded battle against Israel to a more complex 
fight for human rights and democracy. The dominant Arab-American organizations have 
also gained recognition for their criticism of non-democratic Arab regimes.45 (Shain 1995) 
G. CONCLUSION 
The Arab-American community is struggling to preserve certain aspects of their 
cultural and ethnic identity. This process is all the more difficult due to the diversity of the 
community. Divided into religious and national cleavages,46 the community has not 
reached a consensus on what aspects of their heritage to preserve, let alone what it means 
to be Arab. 
Despite the community's heterogeneity, a number of factors favor cultural 
transmission. Interaction between the waves, unheard of prior to the Six-Day War, is now 
common place due to the founding of secular organizations. The availability of social, 
political, and religious reinforcement and leadership has also never been higher. 
45 Interestingly, James Zogby has altered his position on democracy in the Middle East. He now 
supports any pro-American regime "regardless of their internal practices." (Shain 1995) Zogby has 
expressed his concern with campaigns to destabilize Egypt and Saudi Arabia with pro-democracy rhetoric. 
See The Mideast Mirror, Voll09, No 70 (April1995). 
46 The economic data in Chapter III indicates the community is further segregated by class. 
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American hostility toward and negative stereotyping of the Arab-Americans have 
also contributed to the coalescence of the community. Arab-Americans do not agree on 
many issues, but they all concur the popular image of"Arabs are Muslims are terrorists" 
needs to be abolished. Following the Oklahoma City bombing and the anti-Arab violence 
it spawned,48 the community banded together and reaffirmed their commitment to 
educating the general public about Islamic and Arab culture. 
The Arab-Americans have made significant strides in community coalescence. 
However, they have not reached the level of unity required to achieve significant political 
impact as a minority group or to preserve a distinct and common Arab culture across 
generations. The same religious diversity and conflicting nationalities that doomed the 
Pan-Arab movement in the Middle East combine with secular American culture to 
overwhelm attempts to form a cohesive Arab-American identity. 
48 In the three days following the bombing, 222 anti-Arab and anti-Islamic incidents were 
recorded by Jaw enforcement agencies. The violent backlash against the community is not new. Since the 
mid-eighties and the Reagan Administration's retaliatory strikes on Libya, the Arab-American 
community has been targeted by jingoistic racists excited by confrontation between the United States and a 
Middle Eastern country. Jingoistic violence has also occurred during the Gulf War and after the World 





Arabs have a long tradition of immigration to the United States. The pioneer 
immigrants first arrived in the latter half of the Eighteenth Century. Predominantly 
Christian male laborers and farmers from Lebanon, they did consider their stay in the 
United States to be permanent. They had traveled to America to make their fortunes an 
return home. World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire altered their 
perspectives. The majority decided to stay and the permanent settlement of Arabs in the 
United States began. · They bettered their economic standings within their own lifetimes 
and ensured their children would have the education and modem conveniences they went 
without. By the end ofWorld War TI, the pioneer Arabs and their descendants 
" ... integration in U.S. society was nearly total." (Sulieman 94) 
Arab ethnicity in the United States was saved from extinction by the next wave of 
Arab immigrants. This second wave of immigrants were ideal additions to the American 
landscape. They represented the " ... capitalist classes, landed gentry, and influential urban 
families .... " (El-Badry 1994) They spoke fluent English, were Western educated, and 
pursued white collar vocations. Scientists, lawyers, doctors, and professors, they 
contributed to the economic and technological boom following World War II. 
The present, or third wave, of Arab immigrants differs from its predecessors in 
three ways. First, is the large numbers of immigrants. Seventy-five percent of foreign 
born Arab-Americans have arrived since 1964 and Arab immigration from 1990 to 1994 
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averaged over 24,000 persons annually. To place this figure in perspective, immigration 
from 1948 to 1967 totaled just over 53,000. In other words, the present annual 
immigration rate is almost ten times higher. 
The third wave is also distinct because of the religious beliefs of the immigrants: 
80 percent are estimated to be Muslims. Influenced by the Islamic renewal and bolstered 
by the growing Muslim population in North America, they are more likely to maintain and 
practice Muslim traditions. (Abu-Laban 1989) 
Lastly, the third wave is, aside from religion, more diverse than previous waves. 
Immigrants are still predominantly male but more women are migrating. Third wave 
educational levels are higher than the community average, however, the graduates are not 
all products ofWestem universities. And even though one in four Arab immigrants is 
from Lebanon, 49 the new arrivals represent the Arab nations in more evenly distributed 
numbers. Egyptians and Palestinians/Jordanians each account for 20 percent of the 
immigrants and 15 percent are from Iraq. The remaining immigrants are from the Arabian 
Peninsula, North Africa, and Syria. 
The contemporary Arab-American community is composed of third and fourth 
generation descendants of the pioneer immigrants and the recent arrivals. Christians of 
Lebanese ancestry comprise the largest percentage of the diverse community. Their 
income levels and education levels are higher than the national average and they are more 
likely to be members of the professional class. When compared to other ethnic groups in 
the United States, they rank below the Euro-American enclaves but are competitive within 
49 Lebanese continue to be the largest Arab nationality admitted because current immigration 
policy is favors family unification over professional or other preferences. 
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the Asian subgroup. Their economic and social status is well above the Hispanic, 
American Indian, and African American populations'. 
Just as the flood of immigrants arriving since the mid-sixties has altered American 
demographics, the recent Arab immigrants have changed the Arab-American community. 
Cultural heterogeneity within the community has increased with the arrival of Arabs from 
all of the Arab countries and a steady influx of Muslims. Economically, the newest Arab-
Americans decrease the community's standard of living with lower incomes and higher 
poverty rates. Culturally, the new immigrants have limited English skills and are more 
likely to resist assimilation. 
No matter their arrival year, Arab immigrants settle in metropolitan areas. Detroit 
and its surrounding communities has the highest population of Arab-Americans in the 
country. First wave laborers were attracted by the employment opportunities in the 
automobile industry in the early 1900's. Neighborhoods in Detroit reflect the cultural 
diversity ofthe Arab-Americans. The community is segregated by religious, economic, 
and national divisions. Enclaves exist even at the level of religious sect and village of 
origin. 
The majority of Arab-Americans also live in one often states. California has the 
highest population at over 140,000. New York is a distant second at over 90,000 and 
Michigan is third at over 75,000. 
The synopsis of the Arab-American cultural experience revealed Arab stereotypes 
do not apply to Arab-Americans. Arab-American is not synonymous with Muslim. The 
majority of Arab-Americans are Christians, and of the American Muslim population, Arab-
Americans rank third behind African Americans and lndo-Pakistanis for membership. 
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Practicing Islam in the United States has its difficulties, but the religion, and, more 
importantly, its adherents are capable of overcoming the cultural road blocks set by Judeo-
Christian America. 
Arab-American diversity makes community cohesion difficult. Since the 1967 War 
and the adoption of the Arab-American hyphenate by the majority, the community has 
struggled to actually realize unity. Borrowing from political geography theory and 
substituting community for state, group unity "depends on the relative strength of 
centrifugal forces, which divide a state and promote disunity, and centripetal forces, which 
unite and bind it together." (Drysdale and Blake 1985) The centrifugal and centripetal 
forces acting on the Arab-American community are listed below: 
Centrifugal Forces: 
• Arab-American Heterogeneity. As already demonstrated, the Arab-
Americans are anything but culturally cohesive. The major divisions 
are based upon religion and nationality. Within each exist subdivisions 
based upon religious sect and hometown of origin. Community 
statistics also indicate economic stratification within the community. 
The secular and religious organizations, neighborhoods, and media all 
reflect the varied Arab-American subcultures. 
• Lack of Common Identity. The community has yet to agree on a 
definition of the Arab culture they are supposedly unified in preserving. 
As Yvonne Haddad (1994) explains: 
Earlier generations and their descendants have 
understood it (Arab) as a means of national and ethnic 
identification, functioning in the same way that relationships 
with countries of origin have functioned for other immigrants. 
The term Arab connoted something more to recent arrivals, 
suggesting the common heritage of a powerful community with 
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a common language and experience, and of a great civilization 
that had once ruled much of the world. 
Centripetal Forces: 
• Religion. Despite the Christian-Islamic split in the community, both 
religions reinforce traditional Arab values and provide refuges from 
" ... what they perceive as a pornographic, hedonistic, drug-addicted 
society." (Haddad 1994) 
• Political Inaccessibility. Shut out of politics by their negative image and 
the Jewish lobby, Arab-Americans have discovered unity is an absolute 
must to promote the interests of their ethnic group. 
• Multicultural America. In today' s multicultural America, ethnic groups 
are rewarded for maintaining their distinct identities through preference 
programs. (Lind 1995) Currently, the Arab-Americans are not 
recognized as an official minority and are categorized as members of the 
White race. (CP-2-1 1990) The community is attempting to gain official 
minority status in order to benefit from the preference programs. 
• Arab Stereotyping and Anti-Arab Racism. Since the Crusades the Arabs 
have been the subject of negative stereotyping in the West. Modem 
culture is full of mo'Lies, television shows, novels, and cartoons that 
malign Arabs. The negative images and the racism they breed have 
forced the community to unite in an effort to counter the discrimination 
and bias. 
• Technology. Modem transportation and telecommunications allow the 
Arab-Americans to literally live a "two-world" existence. 
Technological advances provide a more substantial link with the 
homeland, resulting in "reinforcement of community norms and religious 
practices." (Abu-Laban, 1989) Videos, compact discs, and satellite 
television also facilitate the maintenance of culture. 
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The centripetal forces may outnumber the centrifugal forces, but their strength 
varies with current events and the attention spans of the community members. The 
centrifugal forces, on the other hand, are constant and stronger; they combine and their 
synergism overwhelms the opposing forces. Until the Arab-Americans reach a consensus 
on their identity and ethnic raison d'etre, they will be unable to preserve a distinct and 
common Arab culture across generations. 
B. AREASFORFURTHERSTUDY 
Although this thesis has contributed significantly to the study of Arab-Americans, 
it does lead to additional questions suitable for future study: 
• Muslims in America. Dr. Bagby's quantitative study of Islamic 
institutions in the United States was a significant contribution to the 
study of Islam in the United States. However, a qualitative survey of 
the American Muslim experience is needed. Since the Oklahoma City 
bombing the major dailies and their weekend magazines have run articles 
on the religion. Although the work has helped improve the image of 
Islam, it has little scholarly value. The effects of Americanization and 
multinational congregations on the interpretation of Islam needs to be 
examined. 
• Evolution of the Arab-American Political Identity and Effectiveness. 
The present literature is either outdated or too generalized. The Gulf 
War, the Arab-Israeli Peace Accords, the Oklahoma City bombing all 
need to be taken into account. 
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APPENDIX A. ARAB IMMIGRATION STATISTICS FROM 1869 TO 1994 
Year Males Females TOTAL 
1869 2 0 2 
1870 0 0 0 
1871 2 2 4 
1872 0 0 0 
1873 3 0 3 
1874 2 4 6 
1875 1 0 1 
1876 5 3 8 
1877 3 0 3 
1878 
1879 19 12 31 
1880 1 3 4 
1881 5 0 5 
1882 0 0 0 
1883 0 0 0 
1884 0 0 0 
1885 0 0 0 
1886 14 1 15 
1887 184 24 208 
1888 230 43 273 
1889 499 94 593 
1890 841 285 1126 





1896 2915 1224 4139 
1897 3203 1529 4732 
1898 2651 1624 4275 
TOTAL 12354 5562 20683 
Table A-1. Number of Turkish Immigrants from 1869 to 1898. After Orfalea. 
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Year Males Females TOTAL 
1899 2446 1262 3708 
1900 1813 1107 2920 
1901 2729 1335 4064 
1902 3337 1645 4982 
1903 3749 1802 5551 
1904 2480 1173 3653 
1905 3248 1574 4822 
1906 4100 1724 5824 
1907 4276 1604 5880 
1908 3926 1594 5520 
1909 2383 1285 3668 
1910 4148 2169 6317 
1911 3609 1835 5444 
1912 3646 1879 5525 
1913 6177 3033 9210 
1914 6391 2632 9023 
1915 1174 593 1767 
1916 474 202 676 
1917 690 286 976 
1918 143 67 210 
1919 157 74 231 
1920 1915 1132 3047 
1921 2783 2322 5105 
1922 685 649 1334 
1923 605 601 1207 
1924 801 794 1595 
1925 . 205 245 450 
1926 184 304 488 
1927 302 382 684 
1928 226 387 613 
1929 245 387 632 
1930 249 388 637 
1931 103 241 344 
1932 114 170 284 
Total 69513 36877 106390 
Table A-2. Number of Syrian Immigrants from 1899 to 1932. After Orfalea. 
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Year Arabian Egypt Iraq Jordan Lebanon North Palestine Syria 
Peninsula Africa 
1948 1 184 107 103 376 345 
1949 2 165 100 4 19 118 234 331 
1950 14 165 116 14 204 95 212 130 
1951 22 169 109 74 220 111 210 131 
1952 89 156 102 132 175 77 156 107 
1953 136 168 125 186 261 222 118 124 
1954 110 264 162 181 324 483 165 180 
1955 90 214 159 271 276 547 140 155 
1956 101 272 163 430 390 670 384 185 
1957 110 332 180 519 411 768 475 198 
1958 101 498 215 377 366 755 151 209 
1959 103 1177 238 360 438 772 247 234 
1960 120 854 304 371 511 769 205 207 
1961 139 452 256 485 498 681 173 191 
1962 133 384 314 515 406 669 256 245 
1963 134 760 426 556 448 739 196 226 
1964 168 828 381 529 410 781 197 244 
1965 174 1429 279 532 430 637 170 255 
1966 242 1181 657 1005 535 638 320 333 
1967 195 1703 1071 1183 752 701 421 555 
Table A-3. Number of Arab Immigrants from 1948-1967. Arabian Peninsula 
includes those immigrants from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen in all of its forms. North Africa includes 
statistics for persons arriving from Algeria, Djibouti, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and 
Tunisia. After 1967, Palestinians immigrants are included in the total for Jordan. 
After Orfalea. 
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Year Arabian Egypt Iraq Jordan Lebanon North Syria 
Peninsula Africa 
1968 214 2124 540 2010 892 788 644 
1969 453 3411 1208 2617 1313 836 904 
1970 641 4937 1202 2842 1903 777 1026 
1971 706 3643 1231 2588 1867 635 951 
1972 1147 2512 1491 2756 1984 689 1012 
1973 402 2274 1039 2450 1977 696 1128 
1974 848 1831 2281 2838 2400 672 1082 
1975 549 1707 2796 2578 2075 604 1222 
1976 984 2290 4038 3328 4532 847 1666 
1977 682 . 2328 2811 2875 5685 684 1676 
1978 712 2836 2188 3483 4556 854 1416 
1979 854 3241 2871 3360 4634 906 1528 
1980 918 2833 2658 3322 4136 980 1658 
1981 1145 3366 2535 2825 3955 1032 2127 
1982 982 2800 3105 2923 3529 1015 2354 
1983 1111 2600 2343 2718 2941 1126 1683 
1984 1105 2642 2930 2438 3213 1207 1723 
1985 1335 2802 1951 2998 3385 1385 1518 
TOTAL 16972 61532 44682 58673 62051 26069 29903 
Table A-3. Number of Arab Immigrants from 1948 to 1985, Continued. After 1967 
Palestinian Immigrants Were Grouped with the Jordanians. 
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Year Arabian Egypt Iraq Jordan Lebanon Morocco Syria 
Peninsula 
1986 1191 2989 1323 3081 3994 646 1604 
1987 1378 3377 1072 3125 4367 635 1669 
1988 1556 3016 1022 3232 4910 715 2183 
1989 1922 3717 1516 3921 5716 984 2675 
1990 2930 4117 1756 4449 5634 1200 2972 
1991 2960 5602 1494 4259 6009 1601 2837 
1992 3025 3576 4111 4036 5836 1316 2940 
1993 2922 3556 .4072 4741 5465 1176 2933 
1994 2474 3392 6025 3990 4319 1074 2426 
TOTAL 20358 33342 22391 34834 46250 9347 22239 
Table A-4. Arab Immigration from 1986 to 1994. After Immigration and 
Naturalization Services. Arabian Peninsula includes persons from Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, and Yemen. 
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APPENDIX B. SUMMARY OF EASTERN CHRISTIAN CHURCHES 
1. Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese 
The Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and All the East, more commonly referred 
to as the Antiochian Orthodox Church, was founded by apostles Peter and Paul. The first 
Arab faithful to arrive in America were welcomed into the Russian Orthodox Churches. 
As their numbers increased, a distinct Syro-Arabian Mission was established in 1892. The 
first priest, Archimandrite Raphael Hawaweeny, arrived from Syria in 1896 and 
established the first Syrian Greek Orthodox parish in New York City. Hawaweeny also 
supervised the building ofthe first church, Saint Nicholas, consecrated in 1902. In return 
for his dedication to parishioners, Hawaweeny was designated the first Syrian Greek 
Hierarch in America. 
Hawaweeny' s death coincided with the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The loss 
of the church's founding father and the chaos in the Church hierarchy created by the 
revolution shattered the church into competing factions. The church remained in disarray 
until1975 when Metropolitan Phillip Saliba of the Archdiocese ofNew York and 
Archbishop Michael Shaheen ofthe Archdiocese ofToledo signed the Articles of 
Unification. Today the archdiocese includes 3000 clergymen that govern 170 churches 
nationwide. Church membership is estimated at 250,000 communicants. (Arab-American 
Almanac 1994) 
2. The Maronite Catholic Diocese 
The Maronite Church originated in Syria during the fourth and fifth centuries. 
Following the Apolisitc See of Antioch, the Maronites use the language of Christ, Aramaic 
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in their liturgy. The sect has faced enormous persecution including the massacre of350 
monks for their adherence to the Council ofChalcedons' edict on the Trinity. Continued 
persecution forced the Maronites to leave Syria. The majority resettled in the mountains 
of Lebanon. Maronites began to arrive in the United States in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. Church perpetuation and participation remained dependent on a 
steady influx of immigrant priests. Not until the foundation of the Our Lady of Lebanon 
Seminary in Washington DC could America educate and ordain its own priests. The first 
Maronite Exarch, Bishop Francis Zayek, was later appointed in 1966 to supervise the 47 
parishes and over 50,000 members. (Arab-American Almanac1994) 
3. The Melkite Catholic Diocese 
The Melkite sect of the Eastern churches originated with the Council of 
Chalcedons decree on the nature of Christ in 451. Those who followed the Byzantine 
Emperors in embracing the decree were labeled the King's Men or in Syriac, Melkites. 
After a time, the term narrowed in use and referred to only those members of the 
Byzantine branch of the Church of Antioch. 
During the 18th century the Melkites split into two patriarchates: Orthodox and 
Catholic. The Orthodox dropped the label Melkites in favor of Antiochian Orthodox. The 
Catholics kept the name Melkite after their union with Rome. Melkites presence in 
America dates back to the 1840's. Although exact numbers are unknown, they were a 
significant enough population to warrant a fund raising visit from Father Flavianos Kfoury 
in 1849. In 1889 the first permanent clergy arrived to establish parishes in New York and 
Chicago. 
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Despite their alignment with Rome, the Melkites were not a welcome addition to 
Catholic America. American bishops and clergy viewed the sect as corrupting influence. 
For this reason, the Melkites were unable to organize a diocese until1966 when an 
Exarchate was formed under Bishop Justin Najmy. In 1976 the Exarchate was elevated to 
status ofEparchy and Archbishop Joseph Tawil was chosen to lead the Diocese. At 
present the Melkites have 84 active clergy from Archbishop down to deacons. The 
church's 25,000 members are scattered in 42 parishes in 18 states. (Arab-American 
Almanac 1994; Haddad 1994) 
4. The Chaldean Church 
Chaldean Christians trace their ancestry to the Babylonians and the Assyrians. 
Most come from what is today modern Iraq but Chaldeans from neighboring Iran or Syria 
are not unusual. The apostle, St. Thomas, and two of his assistants brought Christianity to 
the region. Like the Maronites, Chaldeans perform their services in Aramaic. 
The first arrival of significant numbers of Chaldeans in the United States followed 
World War I. However, the Chaldeans would have to wait through another war before 
the first priest was sent to America in 194 7. The American Chaldeans remained under the 
tutelage of the Roman Catholic hierarchy until1982 when Pope John Paul IT created an 
official diocese ofChaldeans in the United States. The Chaldean parishes are few in 
number but have large memberships. The over 45,000 Chaldeans attend one often 
parishes located in either Detroit, California, or Chicago. (Arab-American Almanac 1994; 
Haddad 94) 
93 
5. The Coptic Orthodox Church 
Established in 56 AD in Alexandria, Egypt by St. Mark, the Coptic Orthodox 
Church has maintained their liturgy intact despite the passage of nearly 2000 years and 
endless persecution as a Christian minority. Their immigration to America came relatively 
late in the mid sixties. The first two churches founded in 1967 have since been 
accompanied by 50 others and their membership has skyrocketed to 185,000, making it 
the second largest Eastern Church in the United States. (Arab-American Almanac1994) 
6. The Syrian Orthodox Church 
The first Patriarch of Antioch and founder of the Syrian Orthodox Church was St. 
Peter the Apostle. Founded between 37 and 43 AD, the Church claims to be "the most 
ancient church in Christendom." (Arab-American Almanac1994) 
Members ofthe church began to migrate to America in the late 1800's. The 
majority settled in and around Detroit, Michigan and Rhode Island. The first priest 
assigned to administer to the parishioners in the United States arrived in 1907. It would 
take twenty more years, however, to consecrate the first Syrian Orthodox church on the 
New York- New Jersey border.-
The bulk of Syrian Orthodox immigrants arrived during the first half of World War 
I. Fleeing persecution from the Ottoman Empire, they joined the established settlements in 
Rhode Island and built the second Syrian Orthodox church in America. The small 
congregations grew at a slow but steady rate. Immigration of parishioners from the 
Levant and Iraq have increased within the last decade due to instability in Lebanon and the 
Gulf War. 
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APPENDIX C. DISTRIBUTION OF ARAB-AMERICANS BY STATE 
State Arab Egypt Iraq Jordan Lebanon Palestine Syria Other TOTAL 
Arab 
Alabama 757 279 45 287 3672 367 270 162 5839 
Alaska 148 0 0 0 279 15 76 23 541 
Arizona 1600 568 243 195 6296 497 1820 662 11881 
Arkansas 303 43 47 13 817 144 301 186 1854 
California 27688 19597 6080 5503 49776 11566 15803 8606 144619 
Colorado 1394 489 158 71 3544 489 801 656 7602 
Conn. 815 735 85 57 8612 322 1843 449 12918 
Delaware 250 221 39 24 533 94 202 107 1470 
District of 493 291 44 16 1070 186 116 563 2779 
Columbia 
Florida 7233 3119 696 615 24322 2786 8225 2990 49986 
Georgia 1198 1043 90 300 5792 420 1032 552 10427 
Hawaii 254 '125 0 0 504 10 152 116 1161 
Idaho 183 40 26 7 285 23 145 31 740 
Illinois 10468 2407 1638 1833 8299 5534 3367 1574 35120 
Indiana 1513 571 47 170 3610 471 1773 337 8492 
Iowa 391 221 30 130 2180 165 660 227 4004 
Kansas 579 228 74 103 2937 270 450 230 4871 
Kentucky 569 147 17 229 3153 231 639 162 5147 
Louisiana 1271 269 98 123 6705 454 1659 284 10863 
Maine 156 14 0 9 2623 67 490 39 3398 
Maryland 2160 1817 468 467 5771 1038 1845 2296 15862 
Mass. 2782 2197 383 326 29700 903 7552 1559 45402 
Michigan 14842 1785 6668 1441 39673 2695 7656 2310 77070 
Minnesota 751 760 80 111 6096 368 1114 505 9785 
Mississippi 160 141 9 37 3177 92 314 154 4084 
Missouri 1090 520 119 122 4973 291 1230 827 9172 
Montana 52 37 18" 19 816 23 164 36 1165 
Nebraska 310 186 23 15 1682 14 749 122 3101 
Nevada 553 253 30 33 2219 57 789 272 4206 
New 307 185 51 0 3777 8 628 51 5007 
Hampshire 
New Jersey 5311 11704 632 1234 12261 2367 11722 1942 47173 
New Mexico 712 143 31 41 1974 112 269 210 3492 
New York 12884 15211 2814 2408 31089 4098 18201 9132 95837 
Table C-1. Distribution of Arab-Americans by State and Nationality. After Bureau 
of the Census 1990, CP-2-1. Arab refers to those persons who identified themselves 
as such in their census response. Other Arab includes persons who listed Arabian 
Peninsula countries such as Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Yemen, or 
North African countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, and Sudan as 
their ancestral homelands. 
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State Arab Egypt Iraq Jordan Lebanon Palestine Syria Other TOTAL 
Arab 
North 1348 903 124 265 5619 894 1114 371 10638 
Carolina 
North 26 28 28 26 563 20 204 89 984 
Dakota 
Ohio 5340 1654 267 723 27226 2436 6145 1114 44905 
Oklahoma 790 328 74 153 4308 181 732 340 6906 
Oregon 866 255 104 43 2611 317 1350 741 6287 
Penn. 2893 2071 299 431 19234 821 12591 1907 40247 
Rhode 380 306 9 78 2666 44 2796 91 6370 
Island 
South 608 279 11 118 3732 140 637 250 5775 
Carolina 
South 49 63 32 16 717 24 300 61 1262 
Dakota 
Tennessee 1085 453 149 203 2837 464 700 538 6429 
Texas 7067 3146 495 1498 21934 2944 5322 2381 44787 
Utah 404 94 43 66 1534 105 315 169 2730 
Vermont 55 55 0 0 1359 12 173 47 1701 
Virginia 4122 2462 570 660 10692 2170 2248 2332 25256 
Washington 1725 588 202 235 3784 451 1189 734 8908 
West 256 122 13 8 4178 76 806 76 5535 
Virginia 
Wisconsin 1139 421 9 194 2827 735 878 491 6694 
Wyoming 34 0 0 0 142 8 49 23 256 
TOTAL 127364 78574 23212 20656 394180 48019 129606 49127 870738 
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Figure D-1. Economic Hardship of Selected Ethnic Groups. After Bureau of the 
Census 1990 CP-2-1 and CP-3-2 
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Figure D-2. Unemployment Statistics for Selected Ethnic Groups. After Bureau of 
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Figure D-3. Income Levels of Selected Ethnic Groups. After 
Bureau of the Census 1990 CP-2-1 and CP-3-2. 
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Figure D-4. English Speaking Abilities of Selected Ethnic 
Groups. After Bureau of the Census 1990 

















Percentage of Individuals 
0 20 40 60 80 
Figure D-5. Educational Attainment by Selected Ancestries. 
After Bureau of the Census 1990 CP-2-1 and CP-3-2. 
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APPENDIX E. NUMBER OF ARABIC SPEAKERS BY STATE 
State Number of Arab-Americans Number of Arabic Speakers 
Alabama 5839 2069 
Alaska 541 153 
Arizona 11881 3531 
Arkansas 1854 815 
California 144619 73738 
Colorado 7602 2787 
Connecticut 12918 3352 
Delaware 1470 585 
District of Columbia 2779 1947 
Florida 49986 16246 
Georgia 10427 3692 
Hawaii 1161 274 
Idaho 740 221 
Illinois 35120 19935 
Indiana 8492 2998 
Iowa 4004 1499 
Kansas 4871 1833 
Kentucky 5147 1659 
Louisiana 10863 2419 
Maine 3398 231 
Maryland 15862 6929 
Massachusetts 45402 13128 
Michigan 77070 40242 
Minnesota 9785 2387 
Mississippi 4084 976 
Missouri 9172 2528 
Montana 1165 119 
Nebraska 3101 787 
Nevada . 4206 1222 
New Hampshire 5007 798 
New Jersey 47173 24384 
New Mexico 3492 728 
New York 95837 44060 
North Carolina 10638 4300 
Table E-1. Number of Arab-Americans and Arabic Speakers by State. After 
Bureau of the Census 1990 CP-2-1. 
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State Number Of Arab-Americans Number of Arabic Speakers 
North Dakota 984 151 
Ohio 44905 14816 
Oklahoma 6906 2082 
Oregon 6287 2258 
Pennsylvania 40247 10887 
Rhode Island 6370 1651 
South Carolina 5775 2121 
South Dakota 1262 148 
Tennessee 6429 2800 
Texas 44787 16753 
Utah 2730 703 
Vermont 1701 117 
Virginia 25256 11399 
Washington 8908 3401 
West Virginia 5535 1053 
Wisconsin 6694 2178 
Wyoming 256 60 
Table E-1. Number of Arab-Americans and Arabic Speakers by State, Continued. 
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APPENDIX F. DISTRIBUTION OF ISLAMIC SCHOOLS AND MOSQUES 
State Number of Number 
Islamic Schools of MoSQues 
Alabama 0 15 
Alaska 0 1 
Arizona 1 8 
Arkansas 1 4 
California 12 117 
Colorado 1 11 
Connecticut 0 16 
Delaware 0 2 
District of Columbia 0 13 
Florida 4 31 
Georgia 3 24 
Hawaii 0 1 
Idaho 0 6 
Illinois 8 74 
Indiana 2 20 
Iowa 0 5 
Kansas 0 4 
Kentucky 1 10 
louisiana 1 24 
Maine 0 0 
Maryland 4 16 
Massachusetts 2 22 
Michigan 9 46 
Minnesota 0 6 
Mississippi 0 9 
Missouri 3 11 
Montana . 0 3 
Nebraska 0 4 
Nevada 0 4 
New Hampshire 0 1 
New Jersey 7 55 
New Mexico 0 8 
New York 14 132 
North Carolina 1 20 
North Dakota 0 4 
Table F-1. Distribution of Islamic Schools and Mosques by State. After Directory 
1994. 
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State Number of Number 
Islamic Schools of Mosques 
Ohio 1 40 
Oklahoma 1 12 
Oregon 1 9 
Pennsylvania 3 43 
Rhode Island 0 2 
South Carolina 0 13 
South Dakota 0 2 
Tennessee 2 13 
Texas 8 68 
Utah 0 4 
Vermont 0 0 
Virginia 1 26 
Washington 1 13 
West Virginia 0 4 
Wisconsin 1 10 
Wyoming 0 2 
TOTAL 93 988 
Table F-1. Distribution of Islamic Schools and Mosques by State, Continued. 
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APPENDIX G. DISTRIBUTION OF EASTERN CHRISTIAN CHURCHES BY 
STATE 
State Antiochian Chaldean Coptic Maronite Mel kite Syrian 
Orthodox Orthodox 
Alabama 0 0 0 1 1 
Alaska 1 0 0 0 0 
Arizona 2 0 0 0 1 
Arkansas 0 0 0 0 0 
California 21 4 9 4 9 
Colorado 4 0 1 0 0 
Connecticut 2 0 0 3 3 
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 
District of Columbia 1 0 0 2 0 
Florida 11 0 2 2 2 
Georgia 2 0 0 1 2 
Hawaii 0 0 0 0 0 
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 
Illinois 3 2 2 2 1 
Indiana 6 0 0 0 2 
Iowa 2 0 0 0 0 
Kansas 2 0 0 0 0 
Kentucky 2 0 0 0 0 
Louisiana 2 0 0 0 0 
Maine 0 0 0 1 0 
Maryland 2 0 0 0 0 
Massachusetts 7 0 1 7 6 
Michigan 11 4 1 2 3 
Minnesota 2 0 2 2 0 
MississiPpi 2 . 0 0 0 0 
Missouri 0 0 0 1 0 
Montana 0 0 0 0 0 
Nebraska 3 0 0 0 0 
Nevada 1 0 0 0 0 
New Hampshire 0 0 0 1 1 
New Jersey 4 0 4 1 2 
New Mexico 1 0 0 0 0 
New York 11 0 2 5 11 
North Carolina 0 0 1 1 0 
North Dakota 1 0 0 0 0 
Ohio 9 0 1 7 5 
Oklahoma 2 0 0 0 0 
Table G-1. Distribution of Eastern Christian Churches by State. After Arab-







































State Antioch ian Chaldean Coptic Maronite Mel kite Syrian 
Orthodox Orthodox 
Oregon 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Pennsylvania 18 0 2 9 1 1 
Rhode Island 1 0 1 1 2 1 
South Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tennessee 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Texas 7 0 1 3 0 2 
Utah 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Virginia 0 0 0 2 1 0 
Washington 2 0 0 0 0 0 
West Virginia 3 0 0 1 0 0 
Wisconsin 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table G-1. Distribution of Eastern Churches by State, Continued. 
106 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Books 
Bard, Mitchell Geoffrey, The Water's Edge and Beyond: Defining the Limits to Domestic Influence 
onU.S. Middle East Policy (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991). 
Bureau of the Census, 1990 CP-3-2 Ancestry of the Population in the United States (Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993). 
Bureau of the Census, 1990 CP-2-1 Social and Economic Characteristics United States (Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993). 
Day, J.C., Population Projections of the United States by Age. Sex. Race. And Hispanic Origin: 1993 to 
2050 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993). 
DecConde, A., Ethnicitv Race and American Foreign Policy. A History (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1992). 
Directory ofMasjids and Muslim Organizations in North America 1994 (Fountain Valley, Calif.: Islamic 
Resource Institute, 1994). 
Drysdale, A. and Blake, G., The Middle East and North Africa: A Political Geography (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985). 
Lind, Michael, The Next American Nation (New York: The Free Press, 1995). 
Orfalea, Gregory, Before the Flames: A Ouest for the History of Arab Americans (Austin, Tex.: 
University of Texas Press, 1988). 
Sulieman, Michael, The Arabs in the Mind of America (Brattleboro, Vermont: Amana Books, 1988). 
Articles 
Abraham, Nabeel, "Anti-Arab Racism and Violence in the United States," in Ernest N. McCarus, ed., 
The Development of Arab-American Identity (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 
1994), pp155-215 
__ , "Arab-American Marginality: Mythos and Praxis," Arab Studies Quarterly, 11, 
(Spring/Summer 1989): 227-50. 
Abraham, Sameer, "Detroit's Arab-American Community: A Survey of Diversity and Commonality," in 
Nabeel Abraham and Sameer Abraham, eds., Arabs in the New World: Studies on Arab-
American Communities (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1983), 84-108. 
Abu-Laban, Baha and Sulieman, Michael, "The Arab Tradition in North America," Arab Studies Quarterly, 11, (Spring/Summer 1989), 45-63. 
Abu-Laban, Sharon Mclrvin, "The Coexistence of Cohorts: Identity and Adaptation Among Arab-
American Muslims," Arab Studies Quarterly, 11, (Spring/Summer 1989), 45-63. 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AD C), 1986 ADC Annual Report on Political and Hate 
Violence, (April 1987). 
107 
----------------~-----------------------------
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), 1991 ADC Annual Report on Political and Hate 
Violence, (1991). 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), Anti-Arab Racism in the United States: 
PreliminaryReportfor 1995, (December 1995), 1-20. 
Brooke, James, "Attacks on U.S. Muslims Surge Even as Their Faith Takes Hold," The New York Times, 
(August 28 1995), AI. 
Cainkar, Louise, "Palestinian Women in American Society: The Interaction of Social Class, Culture, and 
Politics," in Ernest N. McCarus, ed., The Development of Arab-American Identity (Ann Arbor, Mich.: 
The University of Michigan Press, 1994), 85-118. 
Cochran, D.C., "Ethnic Diversity and Democratic Stability: The Case of the Irish Americans," Political 
Science Quarterly, 110,4, (Winter 95-96), 587-604. 
Council for American Islamic Resources (CAIR), A Rush to Judgement, (September 1995). 
El-Badry, S., "The Arab-Americans," American Demographics, (January 1994), 22-31. 
Elkholy, Abdo A., "The Arab-Americans: Nationalism and Traditional Preservations," in Elaine 
C.Hagopian and Ann Paden, eds., The Arab-Americans: Studies in Assimilation (Willamette, Ill.: 
Medina University Press International, 1969), 67-83. 
Ferguson, Barbara, "Arab-Americans Finally Coming into Their Own in the United States," Moneyclips, 
(November 17 1995). 
Haddad, Yvonne, "Arab Muslims and Islamic Institutions in America: Adaptation and Reform.," in 
Nabeel Abraham and Sameer Abra.ha.tn, eds., Arabs in the New World: Studies on Arab-American 
Communities (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1983), 65-81. 
__ , "Maintaining the Faith of the Fathers: Dilemmas of Religious Identity in the Christian and· 
Muslim Arab-American Communities" in Ernest N. McCarus, ed., The Development of Arab-American 
Identity (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University ofMichigan Press, 1994), 61-84. 
Halaby, Raouf, "Dr. Michael Shadid and the Debate over Identity in The Syrian World," in Eric 
Hoogland, ed., Crossing the Waters: Arabic Speaking Immigrants to the United States before 1940 
(Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1987), 55-65. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, "Immigrants Admitted by Type of Admission and Country or 
Region of Birth for Fiscal Years 1985-94." 
"Islam in America Series" National Public Radio, Morning Edition (November 7- 12, 1995). 
Jabara, Abdeen, "A Strategy for Political Effectiveness," Arab Studies Quarterly, II, (Spring/Summer 
1989), 201-5. 
Karpat, Kemal, "The Ottoman Emigration to America, 1860-1914" International Journal ofMiddle East 
Studies, 17, 2, (May 1985), 175-209. 
Lewis, Bernard, "Legal and Historical Reflections on the Position of Muslim Populations Under Non-
Muslim Rule," in Bernard Lewis, ed., Islam and the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
108 
Martin, Susan, "Prepared Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on 
Immigration and Claims," Federal News Service, (May 17, 1995). 
Moore, David, "Americans Feel Threatened by New Immigrants," The Gallup Poll Monthly, (July 1993), 
2-15. 
Naff, Alexia, "Arabs in America: A Historical Overview," in Nabeel Abraham and Sameer Abraham, 
eds., Arabs in the New World: Studies on Arab-American Communities (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State 
University Press, 1983), 9-29. 
__ , "The Early Arab-American Expeience," in Ernest N. McCarus, ed., The Development of Arab-
Americanldentity (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), 23-36. 
Orfalea, Gregory, "Sifting the Ashes: Arab-American Activism During the 1982 Invasion of Lebanon," 
Arab Studies Quarterly, 11, (Spring/Summer 1989), 207-25. 
Samhan, Helen Hatab, "Arab Americans and the Elections of 1988: A Constituency Come of Age," Arab 
Studies Quarterly, 11, (Spring/Summer 1989), 227-50. 
Sulieman, Michael W., "America and the Arabs: Negative Images and the Feasibility of Dialogue," Arab 
Studies Quarterly, ll,(Spring/Summer 1989), 251-69. 
__ , "Arab-Americans and the Political Process," in Ernest N. McCarus, ed., The Development of 
Arab-American Identity (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), 37-60. 
Shain, Yossi, "Multicultural Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy, XI, 506, (May 1995), 69-87. 
Zogby, James, "Arab-Americans Are Marching Too," The Ethnic NewsWatch, XI, (November 3 1995), 4. 
109 
110 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center ....................................................................................... 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library ........................................................................................................... 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
3. Captain Frank C. Petho ..................................................................................... .l 
Acting Chairman, Department of National Security Mfairs, Code 38 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
4. Professor Roman Laba ......................................................................................................... 1 
Department of National Security Affairs; Code 38 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
5. Professor Ralph Magnus ...................................................................................................... 1 
Department of National Security Mfairs, Code 38 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
6. Professor Walker Connor .................................................................................. 1 
Box 185 
Walker, VT 05730 
7. Lieutenant Kristy Le Goff .................................................................................. 1 
C/0 180 Soledad Road 
Monterey, CA 93940 
8. N 521 .............................................................................................................................................. 1 
CNO Pentagon Room 4E475 
Washington, D.C. 20350-2000 
111 
